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Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan: how to build new relations with an old friend
Kumar Bekbolotov1  
Presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan were perhaps the most 
important events in the region in 2005. 
While in Kyrgyzstan they took place af-
ter the “Tulip Revolution,” confi rming 
the legitimacy of new authorities for the 
next fi ve years, in Kazakhstan the in-
cumbent leader, Nursultan Nazarbaev, 
claimed a massive victory, gaining the 
right to rule for another seven years. It 
should be mentioned here that the Ka-
zakh leader’s election campaign placed 
a strong emphasis on critiquing Kyr-
gyzstan’s situation…   
The latest events related to Kyr-
gyzstan’s northern neighbor (expansion 
of Kazakh businesses in Kyrgyzstan, 
ill-treatment of work migrants, closure 
of borders, etc.) demonstrate that Kyr-
gyzstan strongly needs to shape its 
“Kazakhstan policy.”
If before, the calm, diplomatic facade 
concealed turbulent negotiations, if the 
mutual assurances of eternal friendship 
only disguised a chaotic policy of ad-
hoc problem solving, now more than 
ever the day’s agenda should include 
Kyrgyzstan developing a new strategy 
in relation to the region’s superpower - 
Kazakhstan.   
Mutual Perspectives:
Kazakhstan In The
Eyes Of Kyrgyzstan
In the eyes of many Kyrgyzstanies, 
Kazakhstan is fi rst of all a country that 
has achieved serious economic growth 
due to colossal energy resources and 
purposeful economic policies, ruled by 
an able and authoritarian leader who 
fi rmly defends his right to strong lead-
ership. 
For today’s political elite of Kyr-
gyzstan, Kazakhstan is becoming a 
strategically important state. 
Kyrgyzstan has begun to realize 
that, despite maneuvering amongst the 
world’s superpowers (US, Russia and 
China), in geopolitical dimensions it is 
above all dependent on Kazakhstan. 
For instance, any blocking of the trans-
portation routes that Kyrgyzstan’s 
economy relies on may lead to the iso-
lation of the country. One region of Kyr-
gyzstan (Talas) is completely depend-
ent on Kazakhstan, and could soon be-
come an appendage of Kazakhstan’s 
Jambyl region with regard to trade and 
raw materials.   
Within Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is 
forced to seek an alliance with the re-
gional superpower, which Kazakhstan 
is becoming. The USA, Russia and 
China will defi nitely remain key players 
in the region, but the Kazakh infl uence 
can be felt with increasing strength in 
the daily life of Kyrgyzstanies.  
It is no secret that the political elite 
of Kyrgyzstan who came to power af-
ter the March events are competing 
amongst themselves to gain the favor 
of Nursultan Nazarbaev, frequenting the 
southern and northern capitals of Ka-
zakhstan. Top offi cials regularly praise 
the neighboring country’s president. 
Some of the Kyrgyzstani politicians are 
discussing the possibility of creating a 
HOW TO BUILD NEW RELATIONS WITH AN OLD FRIEND
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assurances of eternal friendship only disguised a chaotic policy of ad-hoc problem 
solving, now more than ever the day’s agenda should include Kyrgyzstan developing 
a new strategy in relation to the region’s superpower - Kazakhstan.  
1Kumar Bekbolotov is country director of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting in Kyrgyzstan. He holds MA in Political Science from Central 
European University.
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confederation with Kazakhstan.  
In late April, on his fi rst state visit 
abroad as the interim president, Kur-
manbek Bakiev went to Kazakhstan 
and met with Nazarbaev. Acting vice 
Prime Minister Daniar Usenov went on 
the trip as well. 
In late July, acting vice Prime Minis-
ter Adakhan Madumarov had important 
meetings in Almaty to save the tourism 
season in Issykkul. In mid-June Daniar 
Usenov participated in an international 
business conference of the Asian So-
ciety in Almaty, where he announced 
his intention to create a Council of For-
eign Investors in order to protect their 
interests in Kyrgyzstan. Within a short 
period, Prime Minister Felix Kulov vis-
ited Kazakhstan twice, visiting Astana 
in October and Taraz in December.
This attention shows how much 
stronger a role Kazakhstan plays for 
the new Kyrgyz political elite. Yet, more 
and more often issues are raised of po-
tential risks and dangers coming from 
Kyrgyzstan’s northern neighbor.
In political dimensions, there is a 
great risk of gradual cooption and/or in-
tegration of Kyrgyzstan’s political elites 
in the event of the creation of some Ka-
zakh-Kyrgyz political arena inside Kyr-
gyzstan. The idea of joining with Ka-
zakhstan in a confederation is closely 
associated with the development of 
such an arena. At the same time, the 
fact that Kyrgyzstan risks losing its in-
dependence frightens many supporters 
of such regional integration. 
The close relationship of Kyrgyzstan’s 
fi rst presidential family to Kazakhstan 
(involving kinship ties with the presiden-
tial family of Nazarbaevs in 1998-2001 
and the privileged role of Adil Toigo-
nbaev, the Kazakh son-in-law of the 
Akaevs, in Kyrgyz business until 2005) 
already caused many fears among the 
political opponents of the previous re-
gime. Furthermore, so far there has 
been no convincing denunciation of the 
rumors that Kazakh special police force 
units participated in the March 20, 2005 
assault of the main government build-
ing in Jalalabad, occupied at the time 
by the opposition forces.     
For Kyrgyz society, the Kyrgyz au-
thorities’ clear readiness to make 
large political concessions to Kaza-
khstan is an alarming trend that signi-
fi es strengthening Kazakh infl uence. In 
addition, there are fears that having a 
strong enough infl uence on Kyrgyz pol-
itics, Kazakh capital can actively lobby 
its interests and affect the results of key 
appointments in government and par-
liamentary elections.
Such fears are aggravated by the fact 
that in both countries, the personality 
element of internal politics traditionally 
has a strong infl uence on foreign policy 
decisions. During the period of “mari-
tal relations” between the presidential 
families of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
there was a short but noticeable phase 
of rapprochement, when many issues, 
such as the delimitation of the Kazakh-
Kyrgyz border, were solved more eas-
ily. In 2001-2002, after the dynastic 
marriage failed, the relations cooled. 
Anti-Kazakh feelings were raised in 
Kyrgyzstan, and limitations were intro-
duced in Kazakhstan on Kyrgyz transit 
and imports, with a 200% increase of 
tariffs.1
Considering Kyrgyzstan’s inconsist-
ent history in offi cial positions on many 
critical incidents related to Kazakhstan 
(such as the secret deportation of Kyr-
gyz citizens in 2002, accompanied by 
unlawful intrusion into Kyrgyz territory, 
as well as the scandal around the con-
frontation of the Kyrgyz and Kazakh 
wholesale markets Dordoi and Barys), 
1Anders Oslund, Kyrgyz Republic: Towards Economic Growth through Expansion of Export, UNDP report (March 25, 2002) avail-
able at http://www.undp.kg/russian/publications.phtml?l=1&id=39
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the new authorities of Kyrgyzstan may 
in the future fi nd themselves hostage to 
a diplomatic position that is too submis-
sive.  
In economic dimensions, Kyrgyzstan 
would hope to be more successful in 
benefi ting from the positive effects of 
Kazakh economic growth. Economic 
indicators of Kazakhstan are impres-
sive in comparison with Kyrgyzstan. A 
typical point of comparison is the level 
of average monthly salary. In October 
2005, the nominal monthly salary in 
Kazakhstan was 37 521 tenge (280 US 
dollars).1  In Kyrgyzstan, this fi gure in 
October 2005 was 2620 soms, or about 
64 US dollars.2 
Therefore, a number of apprehensions 
can be pointed out in relation to the 
expansion of Kazakh capital into 
Kyrgyzstan, the inhibition of Kyrgyz 
trade and economic interests, and 
the gradual “fi nancial colonization” of 
Kyrgyzstan’s weak economy.
In the fi rst six months of 2005, Ka-
zakh fi nanciers invested 14,1 million 
dollars in Kyrgyzstan, which constitutes 
71% of all direct foreign investment in 
that period.3 According to the Kyrgyz 
national statistical committee, in the 
fi rst nine months of 2004, investors 
from Kazakhstan invested 24,4 million 
dollars in the Kyrgyz economy, out of 
the total sum of 32,4 million dollars that 
came from all CIS countries.4
Kazakh business fi gures prominently 
in banking (Kazkommertsbank, Kha-
lykbank, ATF-Bank), telecommunica-
tions (Alians Kapital), industry (Kad-
amjai antimony combine, Kant slate 
and cement combine, and many indus-
trial enterprises in the Chuy region), 
media business (NBT TV station) and 
tourism (mainly in Issykkul). 
Expansion of Kazakh capital has 
been characterized by the entrance of 
strong fi nancial-industrial groups (FIG) 
from Kazakhstan into the Kyrgyzstan 
market. Due to their fi nancial power 
in Kazakhstan, these FIGs sometimes 
have a stronger infl uence on certain 
political processes than the entire state 
apparatus of Kyrgyzstan.
According to the Eurasian Center for 
Political Research, one can fi nd the vis-
ible and invisible presence of many in-
fl uence groups and FIGs in Kyrgyzstan.5 
They include, but are not limited to, the 
group of Dariga Nazarbaeva/Rakhat 
Aliev (former chief prosecutor Azimbek 
Beknazarov once stated that Dariga 
Nazarbaeva owns 32% of the Kant 
cement and slate combine6), Timur 
Kulibaev (the recent vice president of 
Kazmunaigaz and Nazarbaev’s son-
in-law – through daughter enterprise 
limited company KyrKazGaz7), the 
group of Nurzhan Subkhanberdin 
(Kazkommertsbank – working in 
Kyrgyzstan through its only daughter 
bank abroad – Kazkommertsbank-
Kyrgyzstan). In addition, Alexander 
Mashkevich of the Eurasian Industrial 
Association, originally from Bishkek, 
is a very infl uential fi gure not only in 
Kazakhstan, but also in Kyrgyzstan, 
1 Agency of the Republic of Kazakstan for Statistics through the website of the Embassy of Kazakstan in the Russian Federa-
tion, available at http://www.kazembassy.ru/economics/social/  
2 National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Poslednie ekonomicheskiei i fi nansovye dannye ot 18 dekabria 2005 
goda, available at  http://www.stat.kg/Rus/Home/hlatest.html#Top1 
3 Interview of the ambassador of the Republic of Kazakstan to Kyrgyzstan Umarzak Uzbekov, Nashi Investitsii Mogut Uvelichit-
sia v Razy, by Renata Esambaeva (Obshestvenny Reyting, December 15, 2005)
4 Brief note on social economic development of the Kyrgyz Republic for January-November 2005, dated December 25, 2005 
(Ministry of Finances of the Kyrgyz Republic) available at http://www.minfi n.kg/news.php?fi len=news583 
5 Infl uence Groups in the Power and Political System of the Republic of Kazakstan, Eurasian Center for Political Research and 
Agency for Social Technologies “Epicenter” (published by the Agency of Political News of Kazakstan on November 29, 2005), 
available at  http://www.apn.kz/?chapter_name=advert&data_id=87&do=view_single 
6 Information agency AKIpress, October 6, 2005 http://www.akipress.org/_ru_news.php?id=22653 
 7  National Company Kazmunaigaz http://www.kmg.kz/main.php?page=inc/posted&mid=25&sid=237&type=subm&showm=25
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even though he does not have any 
declared assets in Kyrgyzstan. 
Aggressive infi ltration of FIGs into the 
Kyrgyzstan economy, followed by the 
takeover of key, strategically important 
spheres of industry, makes Kyrgyzstan 
vulnerable to and dependent upon 
economic leverages. For instance, 
investment into the Kyrgyz part of the 
Naryn-Syrdaria cascade of hydroelectric 
stations would secure shareholder 
control over the water resources and 
energy systems, not only in Kyrgyzstan, 
but also in some of the major areas in 
Central Asia. Kazakh investors have 
shown serious interest in the possibility 
of investing in reconstruction of the 
Kambarata hydroelectric stations. 
In addition, there are fears that 
Kyrgyzstan may become a “laboratory” 
for economic tests by Kazakh 
businesses, tests which may not 
necessarily be successful. Expansion 
of Kazakh capital in Kyrgyzstan also 
entails the supplanting and exodus of 
signifi cant (for Kyrgyzstan) amounts of 
Kyrgyz capital to Kazakhstan (mainly to 
Almaty).     
Pressure on Kyrgyz trade and 
economic interests produces worries 
in several directions – raising tariffs on 
transit of goods through Kazakhstan, 
which renders Kyrgyz production and 
export to other countries (Russia above 
all) unprofi table; setting quotas on 
Kyrgyz goods in Kazakh markets, for 
instance cement; and discriminatory 
policies against labor migrants from 
Kyrgyzstan, amplifi ed by political 
apprehension on the part of Kazakh 
authorities. 
A telling example of Kyrgyzstan’s 
fears was the refusal of the Kyrgyz par-
liament to ratify in December 2004 the 
Kyrgyz-Kazakh agreement on allied 
relations, which many deputies called 
“toothless” in terms of defending Kyrgyz 
interests. In the debates on ratifi cation 
of this agreement, parliamentarians 
wanted to include in it the mechanisms 
for solving the issues of labor migration 
and trade and economic cooperation, 
while the administration stressed the 
agreement’s provisions relating to polit-
ical and military-technical cooperation, 
deliminatation of state borders, and im-
provement of legislative cooperation.1
Mutual perspectives: 
Kyrgyzstan for Kazakhstan 
A survey of the main points of politi-
cal and economic interaction between 
the two countries would be incomplete 
without looking at how the image of Kyr-
gyzstan is projected in Kazakhstan.
In the eyes of Kazakh society, Kyr-
gyzstan is a generally friendly country, 
where systemic economic crisis result-
ed in a political crisis, culminating in a 
forced change of regime. 
It should be noted outright that Kyr-
gyzstan is of interest to Kazakhstan 
in the economic sphere as a coun-
try where more or less similar eco-
nomic reforms have been conducted, 
and the level of compatibility between 
the two economies is high. This is 
the reason why some of the emerg-
ing Kazakh capitalists use Kyrgyzstan 
as a starting point for refi ning their 
foreign experience, buying up shares 
of promising Kyrgyz companies and 
investing in restoration of profi table 
enterprises. 
In Kazakhstan, a worrisome fact is 
that the high profi ts of the oil and gas 
sector have a tendency to “heat up” 
the economy, leading to the “Dutch 
disease.” This is why the economy and 
infrastructure of northern Kyrgyzstan, 
most similar to that of Kazakhstan, has 
recently been attracting more and more 
1  Salamat Alamanov and Lidia Imanalieva, Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan: Novy Uroven’ Otnosheniy (Slovo Kyrgyzstana, January 
11, 2005, №2).
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capital from Kazakhstan.
There is a growing understanding 
in Kazakhstan that in the long run, in 
the epoch of globalization, no single 
country can develop successfully in 
isolation, and poor neighbors will always 
affect the situation inside Kazakhstan. 
Considering the fact that the economies 
of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have 
not adapted well for open market 
relations, Kyrgyzstan is becoming the 
most convenient economic partner for 
Kazakhstan in Central Asia.
However, dissonance of political pri-
orities is preventing full realization of the 
potential for economic cooperation. In 
the opinion of Nurbolat Masanov, presi-
dent of the Kazakhstan association of 
political sciences, “for Kazaks, Kyr-
gyzstan is a fraternal country, events in 
which are taken to heart by Kazakh so-
ciety, but the events in Kyrgyzstan are 
interpreted differently by different politi-
cal forces in Kazakhstan.”1
Before the March events in Kyr-
gyzstan, discussion of potential threats 
for Kazakhstan that emanate from Kyr-
gyzstan focused more on trans-bor-
der, geopolitical threats – radical Is-
lamic groups (after the Batken events 
in 1999-2000), international terror-
ism (especially after the explosions in 
Osh and Bishkek), organized crime, 
drug traffi cking, and biological threats 
(strains of dangerous infectious dis-
eases like SARS). Military maneuvers 
on the southern edges of Kazakhstan 
were conducted to calculate the possi-
ble consequences of invasion by large 
insurgent groups through the Kazakh-
Kyrgyz border and mass exodus of the 
population from Kyrgyzstan.  
After the March events, the attention 
of the Kazakh authorities and society 
shifted to the risks and dangers condi-
tioned by the internal political situation 
in Kyrgyzstan. 
Events in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, 
with which Kazakhstan shares many 
similarities (mentality, language and 
political culture), except for the level of 
economic development, have had a 
double effect. First, the Kazakh political 
opposition was extremely interested in 
the example of a more or less non-vio-
lent regime change. Right after the 
March events, Kyrgyzstan was visited 
by prominent representatives of the 
Kazakh opposition, who wanted to 
study on site the successful experience 
of the “Tulip Revolution.”
Second, pre-
cisely because 
of this interest, it 
proved very re-
warding for the 
Kazakh ruling elite 
to professionally 
confront the Kyr-
gyz case to fright-
en their elector-
ate. Throughout 
the summer and 
fall of 2005, Kazakh authorities dis-
seminated propaganda for stability, de-
crying the “Kyrgyz coup” as a clear il-
lustration of a negative outcome. In the 
eyes of an average citizen, Kyrgyzstan 
is now strongly associated with post-
revolutionary looting, political contract 
killings, and economic decline resulting 
from endless demonstrations. As Ka-
zakh observer Sergey Duvanov said, 
“common people have an impression 
that there is no order in Kyrgyzstan, 
and that things went so badly that peo-
ple are fl eeing from the country.”2
In the opinion of Masanov, in political 
dimensions, Kyrgyzstan is a “competi-
tive” country for Kazakhstan, which in 
addition to economic leadership has se-
rious claims to leadership in the sphere 
For the average 
Kazakh citizen, 
Kyrgyzstan is 
now strongly as-
sociated with 
post-revolution-
ary looting, polit-
ical contract kill-
ings, and econom-
ic decline result-
ing from endless 
demonstrations.
 1 Interview for the Institute for Public Policy, December 28, 2005. 
 2  Interview for the Institute for Public Policy, December 29, 2005.
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of democratic reforms. Such was true 
for both the Kazakh authorities and the 
opposition. In March 2005, the most 
fearful thing was that after turning into 
a radically democratic republic, “Kyr-
gyzstan would become some type of a 
mirror, in which Kazakhstan would see 
all its negative characteristics, which 
would be visible to the international 
community as well.”
However, the ensuing developments 
in Kyrgyzstan have strongly decreased 
apprehension by the Kazakh political 
elite that Kazakhstan will have a com-
petitor in the struggle for the image 
of the most democratic state in Cen-
tral Asia. Nevertheless, in Freedom 
House’s 2005 ranking of the degree of 
political rights and civil liberties available 
in countries of the world, Kyrgyzstan is 
ahead of Kazakhstan, among the “par-
tially free,” while Kazakhstan remains 
an “unfree country.”1
Problem areas in 
bilateral relations
Dissonance of priorities   
In Kyrgyzstan, the process of prop-
erty and business redistribution that fol-
lowed the March events demonstrated 
clearly that the priorities which prevail 
are often dictated by political objec-
tives. Struggle for political power slowly 
turned into struggle for control of eco-
nomic assets. In general, Kyrgyzstan 
has entered a period in which political 
reforms have priority over economic 
reforms, which, as admitted by repre-
sentatives of the new authorities, were 
radical enough already under the previ-
ous regime.  
With the victory of the incumbent 
president in the last elections, the proc-
ess of political modernization and dem-
ocratic reform is only starting in Kaza-
khstan, while economic reforms have 
already resulted in tangible results. 
Prevalence of politics over economics 
in Kyrgyzstan and economic pragma-
tism over politics in Kazakhstan will in-
evitably lead to different understanding 
of bilateral issues and posit hard ques-
tions.
In Berlin in spring 2005, the opposi-
tion forces of the Central Asian coun-
tries held a founding conference of the 
Central Asian Democratic Congress. In 
summer, the second meeting of the re-
gion’s opposition activists was held in 
Warsaw. After that, rumors were circu-
lating that Bishkek would become the 
base for revolutions and preparations 
for regime changes in the neighboring 
countries. 
On November 15th, youth activists of 
the movement “For a Just Kazakhstan” 
announced the creation of a so-called 
Kyrgyz Bureau of Kazakh Opposi-
tion, based in Bishkek. Right after the 
presidential elections in early Decem-
ber, those activists were detained by 
Kyrgyz police and, by some unoffi cial 
accounts, with the participation of rep-
resentatives from the Kazakh security 
service. Representatives of the opposi-
tion-minded part of Kazakh society ap-
pealed to president Bakiev, asking him 
to personally interfere in the situation. 
Nevertheless, Kyrgyz law enforcers 
extradited one of the activists to Kaza-
khstan.
After the Andijan events in Uzbekistan 
in May 2005, mass exodus of refugees 
into Kyrgyzstan resulted in the deterio-
ration of relations with the Uzbek au-
thorities. Even though the bulk of the 
refugees were transferred to third-party 
countries, Kyrgyzstan was forced to ex-
tradite several political refugees to Uz-
bekistan. Unoffi cially though, Bishkek 
and Osh became sanctuaries for many 
1  Freedom House, Annual Global Review of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 2006 http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/
freeworld/2006/Charts2006.pdf  
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opponents of the Uzbek authorities.
Fuel and energy sector
Mutually benefi cial management of 
water and energy resources remains 
a traditional point of confl ict between 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. For Ka-
zakhstan, the bulk of whose territory 
lies in an arid zone, water has great 
value. Southern Kazakhstan is de-
pendent on the stable infl ow of water 
from Kyrgyzstan in summer. In winter, 
Kazakhstan has a vital interest in en-
suring that water accumulates in Kyr-
gyz reservoirs for later use in summer. 
For Kyrgyzstan, water has even greater 
value as a source of electricity, espe-
cially needed during wintertime, result-
ing in winter fl oods in Kazakhstan and 
scarcity of water in summer. The issues 
of mutual compensation and functional 
exchange schemes – water-electricity-
oil – will remain key to the energy secu-
rity of Kyrgyzstan.  
Also problematic in recent years has 
been the issue of the gas pipe running 
through Kyrgyzstan and of Kyrgyzstan 
taking gas intended for Kazakh con-
sumers. According to gas company 
representatives, the amount of debt for 
this gas, reaching 18,5 million dollars, 
has already become a subject for inter-
governmental negotiations between the 
two countries.1 
Population migration 
With the growing prosperity of the 
neighboring republic, the tendency for 
Kyrgyz labor to migrate to Kazakhstan 
will only increase. Currently, there are 
up to 80 thousand legal and illegal mi-
grants from Kyrgyzstan temporarily 
working in Kazakhstan (of which there 
are many more illegal than legal). In 
early December, forced deportation of 
Kyrgyz migrants on the eve of the pres-
idential elections in Kazakhstan had a 
great resonance. Earlier, the exploita-
tion of labor migrants in the tobacco 
plantations of southern Kazakhstan, 
accompanied by gross human rights vi-
olations, caused indignation within Kyr-
gyz society.  
Furthermore, the number of people 
with dual citizenship is expected to grow 
steadily, denoting ethnic Kazakhs who 
want to settle in Kazakhstan as offi cial 
immigrants while remaining citizens of 
other countries, using Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan as transit points for enter-
ing Western countries.
Economic and business disputes
The dynamics of economic growth in 
Kazakhstan testifi es that once things 
become stable in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakh 
investors will only be more interested in 
investing in this country which presents 
familiar conditions. This indication rais-
es key issues for protecting the rights 
of local investors from Kazakhstan, as 
well as the possible provision of prefer-
ential conditions. Serious fears among 
Kazakhstanies stem from the weak 
protection of their rights, extra bureau-
cratization in the sphere of state control 
over businesses, and the possibility of 
nationalizing foreign assets and recon-
sidering the property rights of foreign 
owners.
For instance, for the last several years 
Kazakhstan has insisted on the resto-
ration of the rights of Kazakh owners in 
several resorts in Issykkul, last raising 
the issue December 15th, 2005.
The last visit of Prime Minister Felix 
Kulov to Taraz resulted in preliminary 
confi rmation of the rights of Kazakh 
owners in four resorts in Issykkul (Sa-
mal, Avtomobilist Kazakhstana, Univer-
1   Information Agency Kabar, December 19, 2005 http://www.kabar.kg/rus/econom/20051219/80
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sitet and Kazakhstan). The Kyrgyz side 
made the confi rmation conditional on 
the observance of some of Kyrgyzstan’s 
interests, including recruitment of the 
workforce from among local inhabit-
ants and a fi xed amount of investment 
in these resorts. Nevertheless, the Kyr-
gyz parliament, which must approve 
the agreement that includes this issue, 
may again refuse to ratify such arrange-
ments. 
Kyrgyz businesses in Kazakhstan
In economic and trade relations with 
Kazakhstan, status as a WTO member 
gives Kyrgyzstan some advantages, 
but also creates known diffi culties. 
So far, demand in Kazakhstan in-
cludes a cheap and qualifi ed workforce 
from Kyrgyzstan, electricity for grow-
ing industrial needs, water resources, 
tourism, gold and jewelry, clothing, and 
– more irritating for Kazakh producers 
– cheap re-export goods from WTO 
member-states.
Traditionally, Kyrgyzstan has provid-
ed tourism services, agricultural prod-
ucts, and construction materials for Ka-
zakhstan’s market. A newer tendency 
is the outfl ow of emerging Kyrgyz capi-
tal to Kazakhstan, as seen by growing 
interest of Kyrgyzstanies in purchas-
ing realestate in Almaty. Businessmen 
shift their enterprises to Kazakhstan 
and gradually leave Kyrgyzstan. From 
the late 90s, Kyrgyz businessmen have 
started seeking ways of expanding into 
Kazakhstan, and there have already 
been some examples of successful 
penetration of the Kazakh market.
Each year, with the start of the tour-
ist season in Issykkul, publicity attacks 
against recreation in Kyrgyzstan are 
launched through Kazakh media out-
lets. The interested parties are provid-
ers of tourism services inside Kaza-
khstan, for whom Issykkul is a strong 
challenger. This competition will inevi-
tably cause friction between the tour-
ism companies of Kyrgyzstan and Ka-
zakhstan.    
Conclusion
This review of problem areas in Kyr-
gyz-Kazakh relations is by no means 
exhaustive, but it demonstrates Kyr-
gyzstan’s need to order its priorities and 
shift to a more fl exible and consistent 
policy in relations with Kazakhstan. In 
a commonly accepted format of public 
agreement, a clear and sensible policy 
of relations with Kazakhstan will assist 
Kyrgyzstan in reaching a better under-
standing of its interests, and in actively 
defending them.
It must be emphasized here that, by 
and large, the infl uence of Kazakhstan 
in Kyrgyzstan is positive, and that an 
understanding of this fact should lay 
the preamble of the new “Kazakhstan 
policy” of Kyrgyzstan.
-10-
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TOPICAL ISSUES OF KYRGYZSTAN´S FOREIGN POLICY
    A round table on “Topical issues of Kyrgyzstan´s Foreign Policy” was held on 
December 21st, 2005 at the Institute of Public Policy. Valentin Bogatyrev, Director of 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, and Murat Suyunbaev, Vice-rector of the Diplomatic Academy under 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, who also works as an Ex-
ecutive Secretary for a Working Commission on Developing a New Concept of 
Kyrgyzstan´s Foreign Policy, were invited as speakers. Representatives of inter-
national organizations, political parties, and public associations also participated 
in the discussion. Below are excerpts from the transcript of the round table. 
Valentin Bogatyrev: The question 
of what foreign policy we need can be 
divided into three parts. The fi rst is the 
current world setup and trends in its 
transformation, as it is clear that the 
foreign policy positioning of any state is 
dictated by two condi-
tions: internal goals of 
development, values, 
and historical prefer-
ences of the state, and 
structural setup in gen-
eral. A state’s internal 
goals of development 
depend on the system 
of international affairs 
of which it is a part. 
This is what defi nes 
the situation within a state. In my opin-
ion, Kyrgyzstan is a state where the cir-
cumstances in which it exists dominate 
in defi ning its internal goals.
The second part is connected to the 
ideologems that form the space and 
values of a foreign policy. You know well 
who is working on this. The space of a 
foreign policy discourse is overly my-
thologized, since powerful states and 
alliances of states try to impose their 
own understanding of the world and 
policies on others. This understanding 
is rarely benefi cial or desirable for the 
rest of the world. American foreign pol-
icy is a prominent example of how to 
work with democratic values. I think it 
is always necessary to distinguish the 
limits whereby politics ends and ideol-
ogy begins. For instance, all of the talk 
of partnership between Russia and Kyr-
gyzstan in the post-Soviet period is pure 
shamanism, pure ide-
ology. At one of the 
round tables when 
they started talking 
about foreign states, 
Bolot Januzakov, 
President Akaev’s 
Deputy Chief of Staff, 
suddenly shuddered 
and said: “We should 
not talk about Russia 
as of a foreign state.” 
He has a very ideological approach in 
assessing this partnership. 
The third bloc is, of course, the most 
diffi cult – national interests of a state. 
Which means, which strategy and tac-
tics should be employed in order to 
observe these national interests? As 
a rule, there are two positioning para-
digms from which to proceed in foreign 
policy. The fi rst is an approach based 
on national interests; they are declared 
as priorities. The second paradigm is 
an approach that I call “vassal behav-
ior,” i.e. when in international relations 
a state is guided not by what it needs, 
but by what others need. The former 
Valentin Bogatyrev 
Director of the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies under the President of Kyrgyzstan; ad-
viser to the President of Kyrgyzstan. 
In 1988-91 served as Deputy Minister of People’s 
Education of Kyrgyzstan;
1989-95 – director, co-director of Central Asian 
School of Cultural Politics; 1995-2002-director 
of the Institute for Ethnic Politics. Bogatyrev is 
chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Euro-
pean Club in Kyrgyzstan. 
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position is typical of powerful or active 
countries, whereas the second one is 
for weak states or those professing 
pragmatism.  
In what world does Kyrgyzstan live, 
and how does it infl uence the formation 
of its political positions and strategy? In 
my view, the world has passed the peak 
of a unipolar system, and is moving to a 
new confi guration. The peak of the uni-
polar construction coincided with the be-
ginning of the war in Iraq, and I believe 
this is the event that turned the course 
of history; soon several big multi-state 
centers of power will form. First of all, in 
the U.S. there will defi nitely be unifi ca-
tion on a continental scale. We see that 
this state undertakes many attempts to 
form and strengthen its own leadership, 
and to create a united American space. 
Of course, this does not mean that the 
U.S. will resign its world presence and 
domination, but certain resource and 
political restrictions will force the U.S. 
to switch to a different strategy with dif-
ferent actors. At the moment, there is 
an active search for such actors and 
formats of possible agreements. Af-
ghanistan serves as example of such 
activities. 
The interests of Russia and China 
have also clashed in Central Asia. A 
new European area of interests and 
control has been created.  Its borders 
are actively being formed at the ex-
pense of Eastern 
Europe, the Cau-
casus, Turkey, 
and even Central 
Asia, where Eu-
rope still hopes 
to have infl uence. 
For Europe it is 
very important, 
as many Europe-
an problems originate here (migration, 
Islam, drugs, etc.). As for the regional 
scope, a process of restructuring is tak-
Kyrgyzstan is 
located at the 
intersection of 
several regions, 
between three 
region-forming 
centers – China, 
Kazakhstan, and 
Uzbekistan.
ing place here as well. Many people 
would disagree, but I think that we do 
not have a single region. Kyrgyzstan is 
located at the intersection of several re-
gions, between three region-forming 
centers – China, Kazakhstan, and Uz-
bekistan. The basic process by which 
China is forming a region is expansion 
of trade, which is then followed by re-
source, humanitarian, and cultural ex-
pansion. Kazakhstan’s basic process 
of forming a region is fi nancial expan-
sion and frequent proclamations of a 
confederation through the establish-
ment of Kazakh order in Kyrgyzstan. 
Finally, there is a negative expansion 
coming from Uzbekistan: immigrants, 
refugees and something of an ideologi-
cal war against other states and re-
gions. 
In my view, two basic ideologems are 
employed in foreign policy, which work 
in connection to Kyrgyzstan. The fi rst is 
democratic; this means Kyrgyzstan has 
to become part of a democratic com-
munity. It also includes the idea of Eu-
ropean values; this ideologem is being 
transmitted from the U.S., Europe, and 
Japan. Now it becomes an instrument, 
a means by which the situation in the 
region is kept under control, although 
the U.S. will have to concede immedi-
ate control to Russia, China, and pos-
sibly Kazakhstan. The second ideolo-
gem that still works here is “soviet”: 
Kyrgyzstan has to live in either in the 
context of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS) or the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU), and follow the 
logic of development set by Russia, 
Kazakhstan, and China. Foreign policy 
priorities here are the same as during 
the Soviet period – to live under the 
aegis of the Organization of Collective 
Defense Treaty, i.e. Russia. 
Attempts  are being made in our 
country to suggest a third ideologem 
– an ideologem of national distinctive-
ness. This is close to the Japanese 
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model. There are ideas of foreign policy 
neutrality in this space. 
As a rule, these three ideologies are 
considered as a basis for drafting al-
ternative variants of a state’s course 
of foreign policy, for defi ning positions 
in foreign policy, strategy, and tactics. 
However, I consider a foreign policy 
based on ideology as a mistake; ideo-
logical preferences are bondage for a 
state, a source of permanent problems. 
An example is the developments with 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion (SCO) and the American base. 
SCO, as well as CIS and EEU, are pri-
marily ideological organizations. I think 
a principle of strict pragmatism, which 
consists of two items, should be at the 
core of a foreign policy. First, all for-
eign policy communications must be 
defi ned and supported only after there 
is an answer to the following ques-
tions: What will this give us? How will 
the state benefi t? We should consider 
fi ve things under the notion of benefi t: 
real, not mythical protection from exter-
nal threats; fl ow of investments into the 
country; access to markets; provision 
of freedom of movement, and protec-
tion of citizen’s rights abroad. Second: 
foreign policy treaties, agreements with 
ideological or political liabilities regard-
ing third countries cannot be conclud-
ed. In order to conduct such a policy, 
it is necessary to know well our inter-
nal goals. The problem of our country’s 
foreign policy is that its internal goals 
are not yet defi ned. Therefore, the cur-
rent foreign policy is formed according 
to the political goals of the leadership, 
which may overlap with the interests 
and goals of the state and the people, 
but may go against them as well. No 
one could say whether it is right. There 
are no criteria, no point of departure for 
assessment. Thus, observation of for-
malities and fear of complicating rela-
tions with foreign policy partners begin 
to serve as criteria. The issue of na-
tional interests remains open. No one, 
including the population, knows what 
those interests are.
Shairbek Juraev (IPP): Where and 
how are national interests formed? 
Valentin Bogatyrev: I employ a tech-
nological approach when it comes to 
issues like forming ideology, identifying 
national interest. I think we should do 
certain things before starting to discuss 
this. This is not a clear notion. It is a 
thing that is formed as a result of cer-
tain technological actions, involvement 
of the public and its elite. This work has 
not been done yet; therefore it does not 
make sense to talk about it.
For the past one-two months a num-
ber of very serious people have been 
discussing the idea of a confederation 
with Kazakhstan; they talk about the 
advantages and disadvantages of such 
union, etc. However, I think it is all about 
money – big money, Kazakh money, 
which allegedly immediately could re-
solve our problems. This is clear. How-
ever, the issue is: Why would Kazakh-
stan need us? What are they going to 
do here? They made use of Kyrgyzstan 
during the electoral campaign, and you 
witnessed how it happened. They are 
openly making use of Kyrgyzstan, not 
even asking permission or apologizing. 
In these actions, I see our permanent 
effort to fi nd a patron who would an-
swer all of our questions and provide 
everything for us – with the help of Ka-
zakhstan, China, America or Russia. It 
is a leftover from the Soviet period, and 
still entertains the minds of the elite.  
Kumar Bekbolotov (IWPR): I think the 
problem is that Kyrgyzstan does not 
have an ideology of statehood. Citizens 
do not think of their own country as of a 
real state. When talking about state, we 
mean each other, people from TV….
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Meanwhile, the problem of foreign poli-
cy cannot be solved unambiguously un-
til domestic policy is formed. We have 
not laid its foundation yet. Foreign poli-
cy depends heavily on domestic policy. 
For a long time it was defi ned by some 
experts, it was the prerogative of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In my opin-
ion, it is time to promote the idea that 
the public also has a right to raise and 
resolve issues related to our relations 
with other states. Kyrgyzstan is heav-
ily dependent on external factors, so 
foreign policy must be subject to public 
discussion. 
Valentin Bogatyrev: We witness a 
certain circularity. There was time when 
the American presence here reached its 
maximum. The U.S. provided consider-
able help to Kyrgyzstan when Russia 
left the country. Now the pendulum has 
swung the other way. For instance, it is 
very strange now to hear in Tashkent 
that Russia is the bulwark of security in 
Central Asia, whereas the U.S. is the 
devil incarnate, whereas only two years 
ago it was prohibited even to pronounce 
the word Russia! These pendulums are 
always swinging, and this seems to 
be a natural process. Of course, Rus-
sia has successfully used the situation 
in Uzbekistan (the Andijan events and 
eviction of the American base) to its 
own advantage, which makes sense. 
I think we should not rejoice that Rus-
sians would come and do something for 
us. On the contrary, I am sure that they 
have never done anything and they will 
not do anything, as they are present 
here only in a military-ideological di-
mension. We keep hearing the old talk 
about unity, common language, infor-
mation environment and so on. As for 
real projects, there are none so far, with 
the exception of Bitel. What we get from 
the Russian presence is a war between 
two Russian companies…. Neverthe-
less, since the pendulum has swung to 
Russia’s side everything will stabilize 
and become orderly. Kyrgyzstan will 
have normal and sustainable relations 
both with the U.S. and with Russia.    
Murat Suyunbaev: Does this pendu-
lum exist at all? In Uzbekistan every-
thing is simple: Islam Karimov changed 
his point of view, so offi cial policies 
changed. There are no mystical objec-
tive factors in Uzbekistan, but purely 
subjective ones. But what are the rea-
sons for the swinging of the pendulum 
in Kyrgyzstan, and does it exist at all? 
I think it would be interesting to investi-
gate this. 
Valentin Bogatyrev: I would not agree. 
Yes, it appeared as a subjective factor; 
nevertheless, the President of Uzbeki-
stan changed his opinion due to some 
reason. That is, certain circumstances 
and processes which took place in and 
around Uzbekistan made the President 
change his point of view. Karimov felt 
that were he to proceed in the same di-
rection, the state would have collapsed. 
He started to seek backing from new 
connections, states that would not 
blame him for violating human rights, 
political harassment, and torture. Rus-
sia turned out to be such a country; 
therefore, it is not an accidental shift at 
all. 
  
Elmira Nogoibaeva (IISS): Taking into 
account the current situation, can you 
imagine Kyrgyzstan conducting a unidi-
rectional foreign policy? To what extent 
would it be effective? 
Valentin Bogatyrev: Probably it will 
be a confederation with Kazakhstan. 
However, I think that would have cata-
strophic consequences for the Kyrgyz 
people. 
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Elmira Nogoibaeva (IISS): In his re-
cent interview, Muratbek Imanaliev 
criticized the position of multidirectional 
foreign policy, although Karimov’s poli-
cy showed that a unidirectional foreign 
policy is impossible. 
Valentin Bogatyrev:  Karimov thought 
that a unidirectional policy is possible 
as long as it is changed timely. They 
have the same multidirectional policy, 
but it is extended in time, not in space. 
It means that today you can follow one 
direction and tomorrow another. This 
is also a political move, a foreign pol-
icy strategy. Today, any country is in-
corporated into a great variety of con-
nections, and building a unidirectional 
policy would mean to lose one’s sov-
ereignty, to lose one’s state. Therefore, 
elements of multiple-direction policy 
will always exist. A multidirectional for-
eign policy is good, and it is impossible 
not to have it. 
Shairbek Juraev (IPP): In my view, 
inconsistency is one of the biggest 
problems of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign pol-
icy. At the SCO summit, we demand 
withdrawal of the American base, but 
during a visit of the U.S. Secretary of 
State or Secretary of Defense we say 
entirely different things. How are stra-
tegic foreign policy decisions made in 
our country? 
Valentin Bogatyrev: The way was 
clearly demonstrated by Mr. Djeksh-
enkulov, Foreign Minister. He said, 
“everyone keep silent, we will make 
decisions.” ‘We’ stands for the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. A council on foreign 
policy, chaired by Muratbek Imanaliev, 
was set up when Ms. Otunbaeva was 
Foreign Minister. Yesterday I asked Mr. 
Djekshenkulov whether he would work 
with this council. He answered, “Of 
course, I will.” This is the way. At pres-
ent everything is personifi ed, i.e. indi-
viduals make decisions, and they rarely 
involve experts. 
We do not have institutes and formal 
procedures of public policy, especially 
in defi ning policy, because the existing 
expert communities that have consid-
erable knowledge of this area are not 
engaged in the process of making de-
cisions. At best, they are involved only 
in the process of justifi cation. Nor does 
civil society participate in these proce-
dures, with the exception of the recent 
case with the American fl ag….   
Murat Suyunbaev: The state con-
cept of foreign 
policy was de-
veloped in 
1997 on the 
old basis of 
the early 
1990s, and 
does not meet 
the current re-
quirements.
Therefore, 
there is a need 
to work out a 
new concept 
o f  n a t i o n a l 
foreign policy; 
it needs to be 
reformatted; rights and responsibili-
ties of NGO’s should be defi ned, un-
der what conditions NGOs will realize 
Kyrgyzstan’s national interests abroad. 
Their activities must follow state inter-
ests, and the state must be aware of 
what is happening.
Foreign relations are actively de-
veloping on the regional level. When I 
was working on strategic development 
of the town of Talas three years ago, I 
found out that the administration of Ta-
las Oblast had signed an agreement 
on border cooperation with Djambul 
Oblast of Kazakhstan. I asked whether 
Murat Suyunbaev 
Vice-rector of the Diplomatic 
Academy under the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Kyr-
gyz Republic. 
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tional Institute for Strategic 
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of the Kyrgyz Republic. 
 In 1994-97 – member of inter-
national commission on sus-
tainable development of the 
Aral international foundation. 
At the moment, Murat Suyun-
baev is Executive Secretary of 
the Working Commission on 
developing a concept of Kyr-
gyzstan’s foreign policy.
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widely discussed with the participation 
of representatives of local self-govern-
ment, NGOs, young scholars, graduate 
students, businesses, and employees 
of Customs Service, Frontier Service, 
and the Ministry of Defense. Then it will 
be discussed by employees of the For-
eign Ministry, the President’s Adminis-
tration, and the Prime-Minister’s Staff. 
It will be further considered at a meet-
ing of Extraordinary and Plenipotenti-
ary Ambassadors, i.e. people who have 
fi rsthand access to information on the 
external world.
 Before the concept paper will be sub-
mitted for offi cial approval, it will under-
go the expert analysis of authoritative 
specialists like Ishenbai Abdrazakov, 
former Secretary of State, Extraordi-
nary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador, 
former Speaker Medetkan Sherimku-
lov, and a third expert – Vice-President 
of the National Academy of Sciences. 
After the analysis, the concept paper 
will be submitted for the Security Coun-
cil’s approval.
This particular approach allows us 
to engage a big number of participants 
and to refl ect interests of all parties. 
However, all of this work will differ from 
the work of the Constitutional Coun-
cil, which is in fact a huge bazaar. The 
Secretariat will organize the work, bring 
together people, and the working group 
will discuss the draft.
Ainagul Abdrakhmanova (IPP): So, 
what are the main differences of this 
type of discussion?
Murat Suyunbaev:  It is all about 
the approach to the work. What is the 
typical procedure in drafting such docu-
ments? A Minister appoints a group of 
two to three employees of the Ministry; 
they sit in their offi ces and work. There 
is no involvement of the public or in-
the Foreign Ministry offered any assis-
tance with this event, and it turned out 
that the Ministry was not even aware of 
that agreement. This is not right in prin-
ciple. The same with NGOs: they do 
good deeds, but on their own. NGOs 
and local government must coordinate 
their activities with the Foreign Ministry, 
get certain counseling assistance, and 
inform the Ministry about what is hap-
pening. Foreign policy should not be 
divided into separate segments. For in-
stance, an NGO working on border con-
fl ict prevention could write a report (2-3 
pages long) on its activities. Since local 
NGOs are actively involved in long-term 
projects of this sort, within a framework 
of partnership with the Ministry, leaders 
of these NGOs could be issued service 
or even diplomatic passports.  
A lot of events have happened in the 
sphere of foreign policy since 1997. In 
1998 we joined the WTO; then “Manas” 
and “Kant” airbases appeared; the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
started its active development; strate-
gic plans were changed. Since foreign 
policy ideology is a national concept of 
foreign policy, the format of work must 
correspond to these notions. 
A new foreign policy concept is be-
ing developed at the moment. An inter-
departmental working group has been 
formed consisting of 10 members, only 
four of whom represent offi cial bodies 
dealing with foreign policy: two repre-
sentatives of the Foreign Ministry, a 
representative of the International Af-
fairs Offi ce of the Presidential Adminis-
tration, and myself. The other six mem-
bers are representatives of businesses, 
local self-government, regional govern-
ment, and NGOs. State interests in 
foreign policy are more or less known, 
therefore we decided to include into the 
concept paper ideas from these other 
segments. Once the working group is 
done drafting a concept paper, it will be 
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terested parties; the work is not open. 
Therefore, the bulk of such documents 
is not realistic, and fails to refl ect objec-
tive circumstances.
Unfortunately, employees of the For-
eign Ministry have a very limited under-
standing of the country they represent. 
They do not travel 
within the country. 
So it turns out that 
abroad they repre-
sent a country 
about which they 
know less that oth-
er citizens. The Foreign Ministry has 
worked and keeps working for the Pres-
ident. 
Esenbek Urmanov (Bishkek Busi-
ness Club): I would like to ask three 
questions. How long will the new con-
cept of foreign policy work? You said 
that we were late with the previous con-
cept. The second question – When will 
we need a new concept? And the third 
– What are the criteria for selecting rep-
resentatives of the public to join a work-
ing group to draft a new concept?
Foreign Ministry 
offi cers have a 
very limited un-
derstanding of 
the country they 
represent.
 Murat Suyunbaev: We have two 
people in the Secretariat from the 
Academy of Management who exten-
sively traveled around the country and 
worked with local self-government and 
NGOs. With their help we are bringing 
together capable heads of local govern-
ment. We want to have a proportionate 
representation. We never invited peo-
ple we liked; I invited my enemies as 
there is more use from them. 
Ainura Umetova (IISS): Going back 
to the question on concept, how do 
you defi ne the probability that it will 
not merely rest on paper? Have you 
thought of specifi c steps in order to turn 
this concept into a workable document? 
What is after the concept?
Murat Suyunbaev: A concept is not 
a document with direct application like 
a Constitution. It covers a considerable 
number of issues. Later a strategy will 
be developed, an action plan of the For-
eign Ministry for three to four year. The 
strategy and action plan should, for the 
short-term, contain a guide book on the 
country for diplomatic corps.
-17-
K
Y
R
G
Y
ZS
TA
N
 B
R
IE
F 
 №
 2
THE DANGERS OF PROPERTY REDISTRIBUTION
Kumar Bekbolotov, Shairbek Juraev1
The Constitution and relevant laws 
of Kyrgyzstan grant the citizens of the 
country the full and indefeasible right 
to dispose of private property. Property 
rights in all forms compatible with mar-
ket economy were legally fi xed after 
Kyrgyzstan received its independence 
in 1990.
However, scandalous cases of own-
ership confl ict over such big entities 
as Bitel mobile operator, Piramida TV 
company, Akkeme hotel and others 
vividly demonstrate to what extent the 
institution of private property owner-
ship remains underdeveloped in Kyr-
gyzstan. The dramatic change of po-
litical regimes in March 2005 brought 
about a very tough process of property 
redistribution, ongoing to this day. 
Initial signs of a forthcoming ‘reevalu-
ation’ of property disputes included the 
cases of mass looting in Bishkek March 
24th-25th, which virtually destroyed big 
businesses/trade entities that were 
believed to be related to the previous 
regime, and cases of mass-scale arbi-
trary seizure of land plots in and around 
Bishkek. Still more tellingly, the March 
events generated a large-scale proc-
ess of property redistribution involving 
high-ranking politicians, businessmen 
and criminal groups, fully demonstrat-
ing the vulnerability of private property 
rights in the country. For a country in 
deep economic crisis and on the brink 
of social explosion, chaos in property 
rights may serve a very bad role as a 
catalyst of social tension. The country’s 
leadership must take immediate meas-
ures to ensure legal and practical pro-
tection of private property and capital 
against arbitrary attacks from the side 
of third parties and state agencies. 
The beginning
The privatization of state-owned 
property, which became the main ele-
ment of economic reforms in the post-
communist countries, had mainly been 
concluded in Kyrgyzstan by the late 
1990s. The most comprehensive pri-
vatization took place in the service and 
trade sectors, creating a stable layer of 
private ownership. Privatization of ma-
jor industrial, transport, and construc-
tion fi rms has been only partial. The 
latest stage of privatization, still under-
way, touches strategic areas where the 
state earlier maintained its monopoly 
(energy, communications, air transpor-
tation, and mining).
During the last stages of privatiza-
tion, starting from 1999, former Presi-
dent Akaev and his family increased 
their use of power for large-scale expro-
priation of property. By early 2005, the 
family of Akaev and those of his closest 
allies had established control over key 
high-profi t business entities in various 
spheres, from consumer services to 
Increasingly chaotic redistribution of property in Kyrgyzstan, triggered by the Tulip 
Revolution in March 2005, poses a real threat to economic and social stability in the 
country.
THE DANGERS OF PROPERTY REDISTRIBUTION?
 1   Kumar Bekbolotov is country director of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting in Kyrgyzstan, and holds MA in Political 
Science from Central European University. Shairbek Juraev is program coordinator at the Institute for Public Policy, and holds 
MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics.
  2   On 8 February 2005, opposition newspaper MSN published a long list of property objects reportedly belonging to the 
President, his family and close allies. The list consisted of more than 40 companies/plants in key economic sectors. See Rina 
Prijivoit, “Prezident izdal ukaz: vseh otmyt’ v poslednii raz”, MSN, No.14, 08 February 2005.
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telecommunications companies.2
Political euphoria and a sense of im-
punity after the collapse of Akaev’s re-
gime made any property that had ac-
tual or alleged links to the previous re-
gime extremely vulnerable to various 
attacks. There were cases of arbitrary 
seizure of property by previous owners 
who had been fl eeced by Akaev’s re-
gime, by the offi cials of the current re-
gime, and simply by adventurers seek-
ing to make a fortune in this “interlunar” 
time. 
In this situation, the interim govern-
ment’s fi rst step was to establish on 
April 11th, 2005 a special state commis-
sion, led by then acting Deputy Prime 
Minister businessman Daniyar Usen-
ov, to “determine the movable and im-
movable property belonging to the fi rst 
President Askar Akaev, to his family and 
closest relatives, and ensure its safety.” 
Initially, the Commission prepared a list 
of 42 companies to be inspected, but 
later 136 more companies were added, 
bringing the total number of items to be 
inspected to 178. 
The Commission’s report, made pub-
lic on the 24th of June 2005, revealed 
the linkages between the companies 
and the family of the former President. 
Apart from the accounts of tax eva-
sion and illegal use of state fi nances, 
the report disclosed 17 cases in which 
state-owned property was privatized by 
Akaev’s relatives.1
However, the work of the Commission 
itself drew a heavy criticism from vari-
ous non-state actors. It was accused 
of exerting pressure on legal owners of 
various businesses, with the purpose 
of redistributing property in favor of the 
current power-holders. Maksim Maksi-
movich, the lawyer of Akaev’s family, 
rejected all the conclusions of the re-
port, claiming that “all the numbers of 
Usenov [head of the Commission] are 
non-existent, and are the conclusion of 
the Commission but not a result of in-
spection.”2
The case of Bitel illustrates some 
general characteristics of current prop-
erty confl icts. First, the law is usually 
violated in the very beginning, during 
  1   Report of the State Commission to determine the movable and immovable property belonging to the fi rst President Askar 
Akaev, his family and closest relatives, and ensure its safety. 24 June 2005. Full text in Russian  accessed at http://www.
analitik.kg on 25 October 2005.
   2   Statement of Maksim Maksimovich, lawyer of Askar Akaev’s family on the results of the State Commission on 5 July, 2005. 
Excerpts of the statement are available at http://www.akipress.kg.
Bitel mobile operator 
Bitel is the only mobile telephone operator in Kyrgyzstan using the GSM standard. As of October 2005, Bitel 
claimed 440 thousand subscribers, occupying 90% of the mobile communications market in the country. Its 
earnings for 2004 reached 32 million USD. The State Commission investigating Akaev’s property determined 
the market cost of the company to be 150-200 million USD.
The commission established that in 1998 Kyrgyztelecom, a state-owned communication monopoly, illegally 
provided 40% of Bitel’s start-up capital, thus becoming its co-founder. It was also established that former tech-
nical director of Kyrgyztelecom, Marat Mambetaliev, had illegally used 500 000 USD in the interests of Bitel. 
 
Since March 2005, Bitel has remained torn between different parties. At various times, confl ict over owner-
ship of the company has involved Bermuda Islands-based IPOC offshore fund, Kazakhstan-based Fellowes 
and Russian Alfa-Telecom which bought out Fellowes, and Kazakh Alians Capital. During the court hearings 
between various parties, it was revealed that Bitel was owned by President Akaev’s son, Aidar Akaev, and Nur-
bek Turdukulov, former Deputy Minister of Transportation and Communication, via three offshore companies 
from the British Isle of Mann: Kyrgyzstan Mobitel, Flaxendale and George Resources. 
After a very rapid and not always coherent series of events, two Russian companies – Reservspetsmet and 
MTS – emerged as leaders in the struggle for Bitel ownership. The former won the case in the Supreme Court 
of Kyrgyzstan December 14th 2005, and stormed and took over the Bitel building on the same day. At the end 
of the day, the main victims were hundreds of thousands of Bitel mobile network users, who lost adequate net-
work service for several weeks following the change of owners.
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the establishment of original owner-
ship rights, thus sowing the seeds for 
future confl icts. Bitel was created with 
illegal attraction of state funds, mak-
ing the company vulnerable for force-
ful changes in ownership. The use of 
political links allowed many companies 
to survive during Akaev’s rule. The col-
lapse of the regime made these com-
panies highly visible targets. Second, 
it is apparent that the current property 
confl icts still involve people in the high-
est rungs of authority and those related 
to them. This point is illustrated by the 
contradictory decisions of the Minister 
of Justice and his deputy, and of vari-
ous courts in the Bitel case. Similar sto-
ries are occurring with other large-scale 
properties, including Kant Cement and 
Slate plant and others. 
Methods of redistribution 
It is possible to identify legal, semi-
legal and illegal forms of property re-
distribution. 
Legal methods do not formally vio-
late the law; moreover, their use en-
forces certain legal acts. Property may 
be expropriated as a result of lawsuits, 
bankruptcy, fi nancial fi nes and so on. 
We call these methods “legal” only as a 
formality. The selectivity of legal inves-
tigations demonstrates that they only 
happen when certain infl uential fi gures 
are interested. Legal ways of seizing 
property are most convenient for peo-
ple who either work within the state ap-
paratus, or have special infl uence on 
policy makers, since the main tools of 
expropriation are wielded through ad-
ministrative state agencies such as tax, 
law-enforcement, or judicial offi ces. 
The “victims” are usually owners who 
are deliberately in confl ict with the law, 
i.e. who have violated certain legal pro-
cedures. Taking into account the nature 
of privatization of state property since 
1990, the high level of corruption, and 
the exceptional inability of state agen-
cies to enforce legality, one can assume 
that the number of owners in confl ict 
with the law has been hight throughout 
the era of privatization, and remains so 
today. 
Semi-legal means are used when 
an expropriator does not have suf-
fi cient connections to make a legal 
case against the owner. This method 
includes a wide range of tricks with a 
general pattern: the property redistribu-
tion itself appears formally legal, but the 
means of convincing the legal owner to 
give his property up are not so. Admin-
istrative, fi nancial, psychological, phys-
ical and other forms of pressure make 
the owner agree to give away or sell 
his/her property in a ‘voluntary-forcible’ 
way, but one that is formally legal. 
Less often, property may be seized 
in an illegal way. This may happen in 
the form of seizing legal property doc-
uments, or property itself, through the 
use of physical force or the threat of 
it. Legitimization of the seizure follows 
later, and is sought in arguments such 
as “restoration of justice,” or via bribing 
the judicial agencies or forging docu-
ments. 
Implications 
Several conclusions can be drawn 
regarding the peculiarities of the inter-
relationship between politics and busi-
ness in Kyrgyzstan, and regarding their 
affect on the process of property reeval-
uation after the March events. 
First, it is hard to draw a clear line 
between politicians, businessmen and 
criminals in this country. At this stage, 
political power is valued fi rst for its 
provision of access to economic prof-
its. One can easily see that almost all 
politicians have their own businesses, 
while most big businessmen are mem-
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bers of Parliament. Organized criminal 
groups have long been important eco-
nomic players in the country, and with 
the fall of Akaev’s regime, these groups 
gained more freedom and more politi-
cal support.
Second, the abundance of adminis-
trative agencies produces government 
interference in the economy on an ex-
ceptional level, though the government 
has formally adopted a liberal, non-
interference approach to economics. 
This interference results in a big share 
of latent economic activity, ranging be-
tween 25% and 60% depending on the 
source of assessment. “Latent busi-
nessmen” become vulnerable to vari-
ous forms of semi-legal attacks on their 
property, while state authorities dem-
onstrate utter ‘indifference’ to the cases 
of open legal violations. 
Third, it is important to understand 
that one cannot expect effective social 
pressure in support of property rights in 
Kyrgyzstan. The society of Kyrgyzstan 
has not gone through the gradual de-
velopment of capitalist traditions/princi-
ples, and the local population has not 
ingrained private property rights. Rarely 
can one see a “western-style” transac-
tion in the market for large-scale prop-
erty, be it merger or acquisition, with no 
political forces interested or involved.
This situation may have several neg-
ative implications for the country. 
First, the practice of addressing busi-
ness problems via political methods 
and tools very much repeats the habits 
of Akaev’s regime, and subsequently 
sows the seeds for repetition of other 
things that happened to the previous 
administration. Many people who lost 
their property during Akaev’s rule have 
it back today. However, there are many 
owners whose ownership has become 
the target of attacks today, and who 
may well wait for a day to return their 
property. Emergence of a cycle of co-
ercive property exchanges is not in the 
interests of the state, of business, nor, 
importantly, of the ruling political re-
gime. 
Second, purposeful interference of 
state agencies into business, along 
with the state’s inadequate perform-
ance of its role in enforcing the law, 
makes current and potential investors 
scared. Business likes stability, and 
one can easily make investor leave the 
country by telling the story of Bitel mo-
bile operator or Piramida TV company, 
in the case of which even the Parlia-
mentary commission failed to identify 
the main confl icting party. As a country 
with no considerable exportable natural 
resources, Kyrgyzstan is strongly de-
pendent on external capital. Given to-
day’s economic problems and societal 
tension, the authorities must not under-
estimate the importance of real invest-
ments. 
Post-March redistribution of property 
illustrates where Kyrgyzstan stands in 
terms of political, economic, and social 
development. In light of the unstable 
situation in the country and the region, 
Kyrgyzstan’s leadership has to develop 
a consistent and well thought-out policy 
to avoid further escalation of events.
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EMIL UMETALIEV:
GUEST OF THE ISSUE
IPP: Mr. Umetaliev, how do you eval-
uate what happened on March 24th, 
2005? What was it according to a busi-
nessman? 
Emil Umetaliev: From the retrospec-
tive of the past ten months, I would say 
that those events set a precedent for 
changes of power. That is probably the 
biggest value of those events. Actually, 
the public did not have a well thought-
out decision regarding the strategy for 
the country’s development. Separate 
groups, each of us perhaps, had some 
understanding in that regard; however, 
there was not a consolidated choice of 
a way. Moreover, there were no propos-
als either. Thus, on March 24th we had 
emancipation – emancipation from the 
regime which annoyed everyone, the 
regime with which everyone was disap-
pointed. Certain parts of the society, in-
cluding the business community, were 
concerned about their future, as mo-
nopoly over political power and econ-
omy always threatens development of 
business and the economy. 
IPP: Today, according to many ex-
perts, we are observing a tough proc-
ess of redistribution of property. It is 
diffi cult to understand what is going on 
with Bitel, Pyramida and other compa-
nies. What do you think is the main rea-
son for such developments?
Emil Umetaliev: We are experienc-
ing the consequences of a situation 
when a pendulum swung in a different 
direction. Under the previous regime, 
this pendulum was artifi cially defl ected 
in one direction. The previous regime 
dominated in some spheres of the 
economy, in a specifi c business. Now 
that pendulum has swung in a different 
direction, a derivative of legal mayhem. 
It would not happen were there fun-
damentals of law in the foundation of 
the state. It is bad that the pendulum 
swung from one extreme to another. 
On the other hand it is good, as there is 
now a polarity of forces and the existing 
vacuum is disappearing. We would like 
this process to be directed at establish-
ing a progressive and more logical bal-
ance of powers. 
Today the assets of the previous re-
gime are being called into question. 
Some are indifferent to this, but other 
people are willing to take revenge. This 
situation allows some to act as a Robin 
Hood. On the other hand, loopholes in 
“Unprotected business does not have confi dence in further development, and 
is set to withdraw capital from the country.”
Our guest is Emil Satarovich Umetaliev, President of the company Kyrgyz Concept 
and Chairman of the Bishkek Business Council. Mr. Umetaliev is one of Kyrgyzstan’s 
most experienced and successful businessmen; Kyrgyz Concept, founded 1990, is 
one of the biggest players in the service sector today. Mr. Umetaliev is also actively 
participating in the work of a dozen commissions, councils, and associations, namely 
the Union of Taxpayers, Board of the Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan, the Congress of 
Business Associations, etc. Our conversation is about the processes that are taking 
place in the sphere of private property, and their consequences for business in the 
country. 
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legislation were used, resulting in judi-
cial precedents that allow for manipula-
tion. Therefore, without having specifi c 
criteria the public cannot build its rela-
tion to the current processes. Yes, in-
stability is bad, so is property redistribu-
tion, but it is diffi cult for the majority of 
the society to learn who is right. 
IPP: How do you evaluate the conse-
quences of the current developments 
for the private business and foreign 
investments, both in the medium and 
long-term? 
Emil Umetaliev: The consequences 
are already being felt. Except for big in-
vestors who can be interested in certain 
sectors of the economy with natural re-
sources, and who are able to come to 
agreement with the government, the 
rest of the dependent entities of small 
and medium business are concerned 
and afraid – many of them are leaving 
the country either due to their concerns 
and fears or due to pressures exerted 
on them. Therefore, it is a very strained 
situation at the moment: small and me-
dium business – unprotected business 
– not only has no confi dence in further 
development, in receiving investment, 
but is further set on withdrawing assets 
from the country. 
IPP: Today we are observing an 
ever-increasing role of fi nancial and 
business-structures from neighbour-
ing countries, in particular Kazakhstan, 
Russia, and, to a certain degree, China. 
How do you view the process of their 
penetration into Kyrgyzstani business?
Emil Umetaliev: This is a natural 
process. If there is a lot of money, and 
there is no room for the Kazakh econo-
my to invest it at home, it expands and 
simply reaches out to our country. We 
should not talk about our failure, as this 
would happen anyway, even in a much 
worse condition. Even if we had dev-
astation they would have come here 
and, risks notwithstanding, would have 
invested in order to profi t. A risky busi-
ness knows how to profi t under any 
conditions. Even during a fl ood, dev-
astation, and war. This is not the type 
of business which facilitates develop-
ment. However, under better conditions 
there would be a hundred times better 
investments. 
IPP: What will the consequences be 
of the penetration of foreign capital in-
to our business? For instance, into the 
banking sphere?
Emil Umetaliev: There are adequate 
modern rules which regulate the pro-
cess and protect the country. You may 
allow foreign capital to enter our do-
mestic market, our banking sector, but 
you should indicate certain segments 
so that the foreign capital cannot entire-
ly control the country’s economy. There 
are reasonable limits and you just have 
to set them.
There is a widespread misconcep-
tion that you have to separate your own 
interests from the interests of foreign 
capital. However, the main thing is that 
people should have the opportunity for 
self-suffi ciency. Does it matter whose 
money this is? There is always a short-
age of one’s own money. Even the big-
gest countries live with the help of for-
eign investment. The United States is 
the country which receives most of the 
foreign investment compared to others. 
All countries attract foreign investment 
for their development. China, which is 
demonstrating rapid economic growth 
today, is developing namely due to 
foreign investment. Therefore, foreign 
money is the only opportunity for the 
development of the economy and im-
provement of the nation’s welfare. This 
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is the fi rst thing. The second thing is that 
the main criterion for us should be not 
the citizenship of an investor, but the 
number of jobs, the number of emerg-
ing enterprises, the size of the aver-
age per capita income, the number of 
investments attracted into the country, 
and only in the last place – public reve-
nues from investment. Public revenues 
will be the result 
of the abovemen-
tioned factors. One 
has to fi ght over 
foreign investment; 
the entire world 
fi ghts over invest-
ments. Our old 
mentality is mak-
ing us fear, be jealous, and show irra-
tional concerns. Indeed, it is profi table, 
as any owner will make his money work 
effectively. Our only concern will be the 
protection of the environment, life, and 
health of the people.
IPP: You are a Chairman of the Bish-
kek Business Club. What kind of mea-
sures and activities are you able to un-
dertake in order to improve the climate 
for development of private business? 
Emil Umetaliev: We started to work 
in several directions at once. First, 
those who make decisions should have 
accurate information on economic and 
business conditions so that their deci-
sions corresponded to reality. Second, 
we develop private projects, such as 
changing certain taxes in favor of en-
trepreneurship, or a project on budg-
etary dialogue designed to make sure 
that the process of forming the politics 
of interrelations between the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and our govern-
ment is more transparent and takes in-
to account our national interests. Third, 
we conduct fee-based business forums 
for interested people and motivated 
managers. At these forums we can 
consider perspective issues, develop 
certain technologies, opinions, and 
ideas, as well as consider issues that 
can be used for strategic planning.  The 
fi rst forum was on Kyrgyz export strat-
egy; the topic of the second forum was 
“Shady KR (Kyrgyz Republic) or Sunny 
KG (Kyrgyzstan)”; the third – “Is Edu-
cation a Business or Enlightenment?”, 
and the fourth – “A Stabilizing Role of 
the Middle Class”. For the fourth, re-
gardless the issues we discussed, we 
always stumbled over the problem of 
the form of government; that is why the 
Bishkek Business Club started to ac-
tively participate in the Constitutional 
reform in 2005.   
IPP: And what should the govern-
ment do in order to create a favorable 
climate for the development of private 
business?
Emil Umetaliev: The fi rst thing the 
government should do is change the 
Constitution. The Constitution must 
bear in-depth changes and become a 
progressive document that takes into 
account the international experience of 
developed countries. The Constitution 
should include the following: setting 
up a parliamentary republic and party 
democracy; providing preconditions 
for fair elections based on program-
matic goals; consolidating the nation 
through elections with party lists and 
a proportional system; forming admin-
istration from the bottom up through 
elections, not by appointment; real in-
dependence of the judicial branch from 
the executive and legislative branches; 
and a less bulky hierarchy of govern-
ment. The government may have only 
three levels, since there is no socialist 
property now, and therefore no neces-
sity to manage property and economy. 
Considerable powers have already 
Does is matter 
whose money 
this is?     The 
main thing is 
t h a t  p e o p l e 
have the oppor-
tunity for self-
suffi ciency.
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been passed to property owners – en-
terprises and local self-governing bod-
ies. Power should be shared with local 
self-government, and should allow it to 
be established through elections and to 
develop the budget from bottom to top.
 Moreover, all of these reforms should 
be realized step by step. For instance, 
as it was already suggested by the Peo-
ples’ Coalition of Democratic Forces, 
we need to hold by-elections for thir-
ty more seats in parliament based on 
party lists, and fi ll in seats of outgoing 
MPs only through elections with party 
lists. All elections in general should be 
done on a party basis. This reform will 
be a consolidating factor in uniting the 
nation. Secondly, it will lead to the dis-
carding of tribalism and clan politics. 
Thirdly, programs and strategies sup-
ported by the whole country will come 
to the fore, instead of the selfi sh goals 
of certain groups of people. 
The thing is that monopolistic busi-
ness is already mixed up with power, 
and monopolistic business is the center 
of evil in peoples’ minds. But we are talk-
ing about small and medium business-
es, which use more effective means 
to increase the nation’s self-suffi cien-
cy and welfare. In fact, medium busi-
nesses are vulnerable and unprotected 
from the arbitrariness of the authorities. 
They have only one way to protect their 
own interests: through associations 
and unions that would promote their in-
terests, but would not strive for power. 
Hence, businessmen are not able to re-
alize their interests without power. For 
this reason, they need to delegate their 
interests to a certain political party that 
would realize those interests by means 
of striving for and gaining power. There 
are no such parties today. There are no 
rules, motivation, or conditions for their 
appearance or existence either. We 
have to create these conditions and 
rules when government will be formed 
through party democracy. 
Therefore, business is interested in 
creating a new construction of govern-
ment and new rules for the development 
of a party democracy. Otherwise, there 
is nobody to whom we could delegate 
our interests: since we are not striving 
for offi cial power, we stay vulnerable 
and unprotected. Then no small or me-
dium business will exist in our country, 
but only groups of monopolistic busi-
nesses bound up with those in power, 
as it is under dictatorial and authoritari-
an regimes. There will be a small group 
of very rich people, and a large group 
of very poor people. 
IPP: Thank you very much, and good 
luck!
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Constitutional changes: issues and preconditions
ROUND TABLE:
A round table on “Constitutional changes: issues and preconditions” was held at the 
Institute of Public Policy on December 8, 2005. The work of the Constitutional Coun-
cil brought about differing opinions among the public, not only on such signifi cant is-
sues as form of government and separation of powers, but on procedural aspects of 
the work of the Constitutional Council as well. To discuss the most topical issues, IPP 
invited for a round table Marat Kaiypov, Minister of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Valentin Bogatyrev, Director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies under 
the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, and Zainidin Kurmanov, UNDP Parliamentary 
Expert and former MP. Representatives of international organizations, political parties, 
and public unions participated at the round table as well. Below is a transcript of the 
round table.
Мarat Kaiypov: Constitutional reform 
in the Kyrgyz Republic was brought 
about by the absence of a head of state 
elected according to the Constitution. 
The guarantor of the Constitution (prop-
erly speaking, the usurper of power) 
left the country, and it is time to change 
the Constitution. Justices of the Consti-
tutional Court of the Kyrgyz Republic 
initiated the constitutional reform. The 
idea was then 
s u p p o r t e d 
by politicians 
who saw the 
strengthening 
of presidential 
powers after 
every consti-
tutional refer-
endum as a 
root cause of 
the political 
and econom-
ic crisis in the 
country. Of 
course, our then interim President had 
to support that idea, as it was a great 
one.
Everyone knew, even the populace, 
that the previous President had concen-
trated virtually all of the political power 
in his hands. In 2002, the former Presi-
dent had to negotiate with the leaders 
of opposition in order to comfort them 
and the people. A new draft of the Con-
stitution of the Kyrgyz Republic was de-
veloped, but the former President put 
on the ballot the draft that he favored. A 
decision was made at the Constitution-
al Council in fall 2002 that according to 
new proposed amendments to the Con-
stitution, 50% of the seats in parliament 
would be allocated through a system 
of proportional representation, and the 
other 50% through a majority system. 
The decision was made and the Coun-
cil adjourned its work; however, later 
the expert group excluded the propor-
tional system altogether from the draft 
of the Constitution. To mention a sec-
ond important factor: if you remember, 
at the time of the nation-wide public dis-
cussion of the proposed changes to the 
Constitution, all branches of the judicia-
ry – the Supreme Arbitrage Court, the 
Supreme Court, and the Constitutional 
Court – were supposed to be merged 
into a single Supreme Court. However, 
after the nation-wide public discussion, 
only the Supreme Arbitrage Court and 
Supreme Court were merged, whereas 
the Constitutional Court remained in-
tact.
It became obvious that the former 
President cheated. Having comfort-
Marat Kaiypov 
Minister of Justice of the 
Kyrgyz Republic 
In 1992-96 worked as 
unit head at the appa-
ratus of government of 
Kyrgyzstan. 
In 1996-1999 Marat Kaiypov 
served as the First Deputy 
Chairman of the Highest 
Arbitrage Court of the Kyr-
gyz Republic. 
In 1999-2005 he worked as 
a judge of the Constitu-
tional Court of the Kyrgyz 
Republic
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ed the population of Aksy, he virtu-
ally adopted the form of the Constitu-
tion that was suitable for him. Then he 
abandoned the country, and according 
to the existing wording of the Consti-
tution, the acting President does not 
have a right to make any changes to 
the Constitution. His opponents wanted 
to take advantage of that situation and 
introduce changes to the Constitution 
before the Presidential elections. 
As for the main achievements in the 
work of the Constitutional Council, I 
will focus on three principal moments. 
First, it is de jure fi xed that the Kyrgyz 
state is rejecting such punishment as 
the death penalty, which is de facto 
confi rmed since 1998. This is what our 
draft of the Constitution contains. Sec-
ond, we introduce a principle of pro-
portional-majority system of elections 
in our draft. If before, the previous ad-
ministration abandoned the system of 
proportional representation altogether, 
now the Kyrgyz Republic secures it in 
the Constitution. And third: the draft 
proposes merging the Supreme and 
Constitutional Courts.
Valentin Bogatyrev: Of course, the 
Constitution is not a holy cow; it is noth-
ing more than a legal form of social 
contract. The public has a right to de-
cide when and where the Constitution 
should be reconsidered. For example, 
in the U.S. the Constitution is reconsid-
ered not often, but we should remem-
ber that it was a newly created state, 
the citizens of which had a many ex-
amples of social set up at their choice. 
The U.S. Constitution was born out of a 
mixture of different systems, whereas 
our current Constitution was created 
by a generation of citizens who grew 
in Soviet formats. Authors of the fi rst 
Constitution did not have the best in-
ternational experience in constructing 
a theoretical model; therefore, none of 
them could know what suits Kyrgyzstan 
and what does not.
Now the situation is different. We are 
learning from our own mistakes, our 
own experience of building relations 
between the public, individual people, 
and the state. Now this chance allows 
us, through changing the Constitution, 
to act more accurately and adequate-
ly. Besides, the precondition for these 
Constitutional changes was brought 
about by numerous prior changes to the 
Constitution, as a result of which it now 
resembles a patchwork quilt or a car 
assembled from parts of different cars. 
There is an obvious need to change it. I 
have talked to a number of specialists, 
experts in constitutional law, and they 
also agree with this.
However, there is a certain danger in 
change as well. I fi nd it a serious mis-
take to reconsider a Constitution in a 
hurry, in times of political crisis, and we 
are making the same mistake repeat-
edly. An attempt to hold a quick con-
stitutional reform, prior to Presidential 
elections, was the fi rst mistake.
In the political sense, a Constitution 
is a system of social contract for those 
in power in terms of the setup of the 
government and relations between the 
state and the individual, between the 
state and civil society. There are three 
sides that make this type of social con-
tract: the individual, civil society, and 
the state. It is clear that any manipula-
tion of the Constitution, any changes to 
it, should be a subject of discussion by 
these three sides.  I think that the Con-
stitutional Council is not the best fo-
rum or form for this kind of discussion, 
as it does not have formal distinctive-
ness or procedural rules which would 
suit everyone. Probably the most sus-
tainable form in this regard would be 
a Constitutional Board, created and 
working based on Constitutional norms 
and laws.  I think a Constitutional Board 
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could have existed instead of a Consti-
tutional Court. Since we did not have 
that form, we had to work with the Con-
stitutional Council. In this situation, a 
procedure for setting up a Constitution-
al Council and its working format be-
come the most important things.
A triangle “individual – civil society 
– state” should become the basis for 
setting up a structure for the Constitu-
tional Council. I mean, it should consist 
of three equal, proportional parts: rep-
resentatives of citizen’s interests, of a 
specifi c individual with his/her problems 
and needs; repre-
sentatives of civil 
society, i.e. asso-
ciations represent-
ing certain social 
groups; and repre-
sentatives of state 
interests, state 
agencies which 
have to implement 
what will be written 
in the Constitution. 
It is obvious that it is not about the total 
number of members, but proportions of 
representatives. There might be other 
options as well; however, the main thing 
is that those proportions should refl ect 
the real essence and functions of the 
government, which provides good qual-
ity service to the public within its au-
thority, nothing more. Thus, the second 
mistake of the Constitutional Council is 
infringement on the principle of repre-
sentation, which was in favor of two sub-
jects of the government, whereby each 
branch of power was represented as an 
independent subject. Jogorku Kenesh, 
the parliament, was represented by this 
many members, President – this many, 
Cabinet – that many, and so on. As for 
civil society, it participated through an 
entirely arbitrary scheme of represen-
tation, with those people who represent 
its interests having no real connection 
to participation in government.  
Of course, there is another approach 
in defi ning principles for setting up such 
kinds of institutions as the Constitution-
al Council: through the representation 
of elites. For example, representatives 
from each elite group (business, politi-
cal, etc.) are delegated to the Council. 
However, this option was not used in 
setting up the Constitutional Council ei-
ther. In my opinion, the Constitutional 
Council was not legitimate in terms of 
representation; therefore, from the very 
beginning it did not enjoy the trust of 
the public. 
Some fi nd the failure of the Presi-
dent to participate in the fi rst stage of 
the work of the Constitutional Council 
to be a mistake. As for me, I think the 
contrary. Participation of the President 
in the second stage of the Council’s 
work was the third mistake of the coun-
cil. I say this because the President, 
popularly elected, does not represent 
in the Council any single social force, 
but the entire nation. This means that 
he represents the same abstract notion 
of power as the people, and no more 
than that. Thus, as a chairman of the 
Constitutional Council we have an in-
dividual with a concrete name, which 
is Bakiev, who has an opportunity to 
pass his own opinion as the opinion of 
the nation, or to put pressure on oth-
er members of the Council through his 
authority as the President. This is ab-
normal. By the way, I have expressed 
this idea several times to the President, 
that he must only act as a manager or 
moderator who does not deal with the 
content. The President must abstain 
from expressing his own opinion on the 
content of the Constitution; he should 
just manage the process. He is allowed 
to speak only on principles and princi-
ple approaches to reforming the Con-
stitution, at least until all members of 
the Council have voiced their opinions. 
What is prin-
c i p a l l y  i m -
portant in the 
Constitution-
al Council is 
not the total 
number of its 
members, but 
the proportion 
of representa-
tion.
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The President maintained this position 
to some extent, and tried not to form his 
opinion beforehand. He spoke up only 
when they insistently called upon him 
to be an umpire. This happened, for in-
stance, on issues like merging the posts 
of the President and Prime Minister, or 
on questions regarding the Constitu-
tional Court or the Russian language… 
However, I think he was forced to voice 
his opinion, because he was directly 
blamed for secretly regulating the proc-
ess of introducing amendments into the 
Constitution. 
I think the Constitutional Council 
should have been chaired by one of the 
public fi gures, or just a group of mod-
erators representing various sectors in 
the Constitutional Council. 
The most serious mistakes were 
technological ones. As a technologist, I 
understand that in order to achieve re-
sults you have to set in motion a normal 
process of constitutional reform, its full 
technological cycle. After having set up 
a Constitutional Council, the fi rst thing 
is to develop main principles of the new 
Constitution and to defi ne the format of 
the constitutional reform. This had to be 
done before Presidential elections, so 
that candidates confi rmed their readi-
ness to follow these principles and their 
intention to undertake a constitutional 
reform. This stage of developing main 
principles was not missed, but on the 
contrary, they decided to include the 
whole process of constitutional reform 
within this stage. In such a hurry, lump-
ing everything together, they failed to 
do the most important conceptual work. 
We had to fi gure out what kind of Con-
stitution we wanted and then compare 
it with what we had.  We had to fi nd the 
defects, which would then make clear 
whether there was a way to change the 
Constitution, and if yes, then how, or 
whether we should rewrite it and have 
a new one. Instead of doing this kind of 
work – targeted and requiring a high de-
gree of professionalism in politics and 
law – everything resulted in discussing 
peripheral remarks and suggestions, 
and then voting on them.
That was absurd, even more so tak-
ing into account the level of legitimacy 
of the composition of the Constitutional 
Council.  The second important stage 
was completely omitted, that is, creat-
ing an expert commission with partici-
pation of foreign experts, which would 
have to do a legal analysis of the Con-
stitution and then offer several drafts 
of the new Constitution. This is a very 
laborious part of the work, and it had 
to be done in a half year. Those drafts 
should be submitted to the Constitu-
tional Council, which then works on the 
fi nal draft, the one that will be submit-
ted for a nation-wide public discussion. 
Askar Akaev was very smart to skip this 
stage: fi rst there was a Constitution-
al Council, then there was an expert 
group, and afterwards it would be logi-
cal to submit the draft to the Constitu-
tional Council again to decide whether 
the draft should be submitted to a ref-
erendum or not. But he did not want to 
negotiate. He said: “I do not want to talk 
to these people,” and just submitted the 
draft immediately to the referendum. 
The most important thing was not 
done, and we see what the results 
were. We got three negative results. 
The fi rst is that we did not get a draft of 
the Constitution which would satisfy the 
public and facilitate better governance 
in the country, or which would prevent 
authoritarian rule. Secondly, we got a 
crisis-prone political situation, which 
could bring about serious standoffs in 
the society, which now we will witness 
unfolding. And thirdly, the image of the 
President has been seriously dam-
aged, and the people who worked with 
him before and after March 24 are very 
disappointed. 
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Presently, the situation with the draft 
of the Constitution has moved from 
legal space to political. I think there 
are three scenarios for further politi-
cal games. The fi rst scenario is that 
everything remains the same as it is, 
without any signifi cant changes. Fur-
ther developments depend on whether 
Jogorku Kenesh adopts or rejects the 
proposed draft with insignifi cant chang-
es. In case the draft is rejected, we will 
have a lengthy, permanent reform to 
deal with for another year. The second 
is that, as a result of a fi erce confron-
tation between the authors of various 
drafts, the parliament will adopt a radi-
cal draft of the Constitution, which may 
cause a constitutional crisis and result 
in dissolution of Jogorku Kenesh. The 
consequences of this scenario will not 
do much good for the country. And the 
third scenario: the President accepts a 
possible combining of the posts of the 
President and Prime Minister in the 
new draft – this situation is a trade-off. 
Everything will depend on the fortitude 
of the opposing sides. They may come 
to a compromise solution, or it is pos-
sible that things will develop according 
to one of the fi rst two scenarios. Any-
way, in the case the radical democratic 
forces fi nd that no suffi cient changes 
were made, then we could expect an-
other constitutional reform in two years 
before the next elections. 
Zainidin Kurmanov: Why do radical 
versions emerge? Here are my argu-
ments for you to consider. The overview 
of the development of the post-Soviet 
states for the last 15 years showed the 
following obvious thing: the fi rst stage of 
the post-communist transformation has 
been completed. The content of this 
transformation was determined by the 
attempt of the former Soviet elite to be-
come a new ruling stratum of a society 
based on market economy. This trans-
formation was made through large-
scale privatization of the state property, 
which made it 
impossible to 
return to the 
old Commu-
nist system. At 
the same time, 
this transfor-
mation was 
accompanied 
by slogans for 
d e m o c r a c y, 
separation of 
powers, equal-
ity before the 
law, and ob-
servance of 
human rights. All of this helped to suc-
cessfully write off the communist ep-
och. However, the emergence of a new 
social order brought about new prob-
lems and contradictions that became 
permanent and restrained further de-
velopment of our country. Essentially, 
power was concentrated in the hands 
of narrow groups, clans, and new na-
tional elites. Business interests closely 
entwined with government interests. An 
income disparity grew between those 
who profi ted from economic transfor-
mation and the mass of the population 
as well as inequity in access to social 
welfare, managing modern technology, 
etc. Entire social groups in some re-
gions stayed out of the activity of the 
modern economy, in further marginal-
ization and degradation of the social 
space.
Bureaucratic government institutions 
were virtually removed from public con-
trol since the majority of the population 
was forced to focus on just surviving, 
while power and property were monop-
olized by a narrow group of new elite. 
Elites used this situation to safeguard 
their domination by restricting competi-
tion in both political and economic ar-
Zainidin Kurmanov 
Expert of UNDP-Bishkek.  
In 1997-2000 – Professor 
of the Law department of 
Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic 
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of Jogorku Kenesh. 
Zainidin Kurmanov is a 
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tion Council of the Moya 
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eas. This policy led to the emasculation 
of democratic principles and proce-
dures, and the emergence of the phe-
nomenon of double standards. Exten-
sive use of administrative resources 
and media manipulation allowed the 
ruling elite to regularly achieve the re-
sults they desired during elections and 
referendums, thus discrediting the most 
important democratic procedures. As a 
result, we got a social order with pro-
nounced inequality in the distribution of 
power and property, lack of social bonds 
between groups, and lack of system of 
public control over the activities of the 
President or his circle, or over other offi -
cial authorities. This order turned out to 
be internally conservative, and instead 
of being oriented toward further devel-
opment of the country, it was oriented 
at self-preservation and at strengthen-
ing the positions of the ruling elite. The 
social passiveness of the population 
gave way for the creation of a social 
system of authoritarian, clannish gov-
ernment. The burden of adjustment to 
new realities suppressed the interest of 
the population to participate in political 
and social activities, allowing the ruling 
elite to impose its own agenda, which 
was presented as an inevitable choice 
between bad and worse options. As a 
bad option, the administration present-
ed itself as unjust, thievish, ineffective, 
but able to maintain stability in the so-
ciety and provide opportunities for the 
people to survive. The worse option 
was attributed to opponents of the re-
gime: radical opposition, fundamental-
ists, nationalists, destructive elements 
and so on. They were associated with 
instability, chaos, civil war, and political 
repressions. The 21st century has been 
marked with economic growth in our 
country as well as in the entire post-So-
viet space; however, given the estab-
lished social order, only narrow groups 
have reaped the benefi ts of economic 
growth. At the same time, econom-
ic growth increased the expectations 
of the entire population, especially of 
those the impoverished. 
New conditions promoted sensibility 
towards clannish government, its lack 
of accountability and highly bureaucrat-
ic nature. As a result of the monopoliza-
tion of power by a few individuals, gov-
ernment became a family affair, and 
favoritism led to a serious shrinkage 
of the regime’s social basis. Layers of 
dissatisfi ed gradually emerged among 
the political elite and the clans who lost 
their infl uence over government deci-
sion-making; among business circles 
faced with serious diffi culties in devel-
oping their businesses and with threats 
of takeover by the ruling family and their 
favored people; among the democratic 
community, which was observing back-
sliding on democratic goals and val-
ues; and among youth organizations, 
because of the lack prospects for pro-
fessional and personal growth. A com-
bination of the protests of these groups 
against the arrogance of the elites and 
their unwillingness to change, to enter 
into a dialogue with the society, or to 
respond to public inquires and chal-
lenges through established democrat-
ic procedures, resulted in total aliena-
tion, and created critical conditions for 
revolutionary changes. Activities of the 
opposition were constantly restrict-
ed; mass media was persecuted; and 
there was only one way – to play out 
a revolutionary scenario. And so it was 
that revolutionary events were caused 
by mass falsifi cations of the elections 
in Georgia, Ukraine, and in our country. 
Gradual movement towards authoritari-
anism and deviation from constitutional 
checks and balances towards extraor-
dinary powers for the President led to 
a situation wherein government agen-
cies, courts, and law enforcement bod-
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ies were paralyzed by systemic corrup-
tion and professional incompetence, 
failed to execute their primary functions, 
and persecuted citizens and business-
men instead of protecting them.
A parliamentary form of government 
has, undoubtedly, certain negative fea-
tures, but there are more positive fea-
tures to it than negative. One can ob-
serve a tendency towards authoritar-
ian regimes in Central Asia, and it is 
largely true for the rest of the post-So-
viet states. Our neighbors are good ex-
amples of that. Poverty in a poor coun-
try always gives way to dictatorship 
and more poverty. According to mod-
ern studies based on analysis of 135 
countries, parliamentary systems may 
work and be sustainable even in poor 
countries. In poor states, parliamenta-
ry forms of government “survive” twice 
as often as presidential forms. I am 
not going to count all the advantages; 
I just want to add that our current form 
of government is found to be the least 
successful by the same scholars. A 
presidential-parliamentary form of gov-
ernment is not about division of power 
between the President and parliament 
– it is about a lack of responsibility for 
the Cabinet’s work. This is the main dif-
ference from a semi-presidential mod-
el. It is clear who is responsible for the 
work of the Cabinet in France, Poland, 
and other states which we may mention 
as examples with premier-presidential 
forms of government. In case certain 
political forces win and the President is 
in a different camp, both the parliament 
and the Prime Minister are responsible 
for the work of the Cabinet. In case the 
President, Cabinet and the majority of 
the parliament represent the same po-
litical force, then the power of the Presi-
dent is strengthened and he bears re-
sponsibility for the work of the Cabi-
net. We do not have this in our system. 
Another basic shortcoming is a dualism 
of government; we have two popularly 
elected institutions, parliament and 
President, who are empowered to act 
on behalf of the people. This is a source 
for inherent confl icts between these 
two institutions, as each of them tries 
to become as powerful as possible. Fif-
teen years of post-
Soviet history was 
all about a perma-
nent struggle for 
power between 
parliament and 
the President. Of 
course, how could 
a presidential-par-
liamentary repub-
lic function in a situation of government 
dualism? It could function only under 
the full subordination of the parliament 
to the President. In order to secure and 
implement a policy, the President is 
forced to have pro-presidential repre-
sentatives in parliament. Askar Akaev 
tried to achieve this and got a revolu-
tion in return. Essentially, we have two 
Cabinets which are in a state of per-
manent struggle; this is a very unsta-
ble system, which will always generate 
new confl icts and push the country to 
new social tensions.
While choosing a form of govern-
ment, we should take into considera-
tion historical, cultural, and national tra-
ditions, trends, and preconditions. It is 
very diffi cult to get rid of an unpopular 
President in a presidential-parliamenta-
ry state. Kyrgyzstan is not the only ex-
ample for that, but also Hugo Chavez 
in Venezuela, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, 
Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, 
and fi nally, Uzbekistan. What precondi-
tions do we have? First of all, we have 
the centuries-long historical experience 
of Kyrgyz national development. It is 
well known that a form of democracy 
had existed in Kyrgyzstan initially; a 
considerable part of our history shows 
that there was no centralized govern-
Fifteen years 
of post-Soviet 
history was all 
about a perma-
nent struggle 
for power be-
tween parlia-
ment and the 
President.
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ment or monarchy, bureaucracy as a 
class, or other institutions. Afterwards, 
for more than 150 years we lived as 
part of a European state, the Russian 
Empire and Soviet Union. The latter al-
so had a specifi c parliamentary repub-
lic, where according to the law the su-
preme power belonged to a Supreme 
Council, although in reality it belong 
to the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union. Fur-
thermore, we have little territory and a 
relatively small population, which is the 
size of one oblast of Russia or maybe 
even of Kazakhstan.  
I would like to point out that our 
President has too many legislative and 
non-legislative powers. For instance, a 
French President has only two legisla-
tive powers, whereas our President has 
seven legislative and twelve non-legis-
lative powers. Probably only the king 
of Saudi Arabia has more power. This 
is the issue: why should a President of 
such a small country like ours be given 
superpowers? 
The fourth factor is an acute shortage 
of time. Reforms have been carried out 
for the last twenty years in our coun-
try, whereas a new country was built in 
twenty years in Malaysia. As for us, we 
have been experiencing endless prob-
lems and confl icts over the last twenty 
years. The fi fth is the ample opportuni-
ties provided by the age of information: 
real-time communication, shrinking dis-
tances, opportunity to make use of the 
latest achievements in political thought 
– all of these opportunities allows us to 
move forward without having to wait for 
an evolutionary stage of development. 
The sixth is that our country is a multina-
tional state with pronounced segmental 
features. In these circumstances, it is 
very important that the winner gets ev-
erything. In a presidential-parliamentary 
republic, the President gets everything 
while the opposition becomes margin-
alized. The interests of various social or 
ethnic groups are ignored. However, all 
of the above mentioned problems are 
taken care of in a parliamentary form 
of government, which tends to be more 
democratic in this sense.
The seventh factor is a relatively high 
level of literacy and development of civ-
il society. Many people say that political 
parties have not matured yet. However, 
we do have about fi ve to six relative-
ly big political parties, and this is suffi -
cient in principle; we do not need all 60 
parties to develop and be on a par, as 
that is impossible in the fi rst place. The 
presence of numerous groups of inter-
ests and the highly confl ictual situation 
in the society, the absence of a siz-
able middle class, abject poverty of the 
population, unemployment, and gender 
problems – these problems must be re-
solved in the nearest future. The public 
can no longer tolerate a corrupt system 
which is supporting only one person’s 
rule. It is necessary to boost the pro-
cess of political 
and economic 
modernizat ion. 
This is also one 
of the precondi-
tions: it is neces-
sary to utilize the 
capacities and 
potential of the 
opposition in vari-
ous spheres of government. It is essen-
tial that we promote a democratic po-
litical system, encourage the activities 
of political parties and civil society, and 
overcome the political consequences 
of tribalism and regionalism. These in-
stitutions start to form quickly under a 
parliamentarian system, increasing the 
availability of charismatic leaders, most 
of whom are now out of the game. We 
have a north-south division in the coun-
try, and patron-clannish relations. Thus, 
in our country we should not have one 
In our country we 
should not have 
one ‘highest’ of-
fi ce, because if it 
is a representa-
tive of the South, 
then northerners 
are unhappy, and 
vice versa.
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high offi ce, because if it is a represen-
tative of the South, then northerners 
are unhappy, and vice versa. This fac-
tor should also be taken into account. 
Power should be equally divided be-
tween the branches of government.
According to experts in constitu-
tional law – a constitution is an arche-
ology of our country. We are afraid of 
repetition at the moment, since at this 
stage we are witnessing the restora-
tion of Akaev’s regime under different 
names. Heads of state, presidents of 
the nearest Asian states, have unre-
stricted ability to win elections for an-
other term. This is a stumbling block, 
because President Akaev was busy on-
ly with attempts to be reelected for the 
next term throughout the last 5 years. 
Karimov is also thinking of ways to pro-
long his powers. This is not a headache 
for Turkmenbashi anymore. If you are 
a good President and people trust you, 
you are welcome to be a Prime Minister 
or Speaker of the Parliament, but there 
should not be a single high offi ce. 
I would like to tell you one more thing 
about the advantages of a parliamen-
tary system. There is an opinion that 
in a parliamentary republic the Presi-
dent will become “an English Queen” 
and the executive will disappear. This 
opinion is absolutely unfounded, as the 
Prime Minister will take over the execu-
tive and he or she will be the only per-
son responsible for the activities of the 
executive branch of power. The disad-
vantage of a presidential-parliamenta-
ry form is that the President is not ac-
countable to anyone. The institution of 
impeachment is impossible because 
there will always be fi ve people who 
would stand for the President till the 
very end. At the same time, in a parlia-
mentary republic the Prime Minister will 
be accountable to the parliament, and 
any affairs related to his children or his 
favored people may result in the proce-
dure of impeachment. In this case, the 
Prime Minister as a head of the execu-
tive branch will behave in a proper man-
ner and heed public opinion. These are 
my arguments, which I present for your 
judgment.
Kumar Bekbolotov (IWPR): What 
proportion of the seats in parliament 
will be allocated through a party lists?  
Marat Kaiypov: This is not indicated 
in the Constitution, but it was discussed 
in the working group that no more than 
30% of the seats in parliament should 
be elected by a major system in single 
mandate districts, so that the dominat-
ing majority would be elected on propor-
tional basis. This variant has been sug-
gested to complicate the bribery sys-
tem. Unfortunately, my suggestion did 
not pass into the Constitution project. 
I suggested the following scheme: par-
liament members elected on the basis 
of a mixed form and single mandate 
must leave their position every two 
years. This way they can’t take advan-
tage of their MP privileges – one cannot 
steel a lot in only two years. Second-
ly, due to their small numbers they will 
have to join either some party or coa-
lition. Thirdly, single mandate MPs will 
be busier taking care of their electorate 
and fulfi lling their promises. Since they 
have to be elected again in two years, 
they will constantly be thinking of this. 
Hence, it will be more complicated for 
candidates to win illegally by grafting 
an electorate.  
Ainagul Abdrakhmanova (IPP): 
When do you think it is possible to hold 
such elections? 
Marat Kaiypov: You are all aware 
that according to the present Consti-
tution, the head of state defi nes refer-
endum issues, i.e. he decides whether 
a Constitution should be introduced to 
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referendum or addressed to the parlia-
ment. He had no doubts on parliament 
ad interim; he is still working with it. I 
think he will introduce some amend-
ments to the parliament. In case the 
parliament approves the draft, we will 
see if it contains a proportional system 
for elections. Then we can talk on fur-
ther steps. Meanwhile we cannot say 
when it is going to happen. 
Rakhat Mamytkojoev (“Erkin Kyr-
gyzstan” party): I have one question 
to Marat Tashtanovich as a lawyer. In 
what way will elections take place – will 
parties run independently, or will some 
of them be able to unite into pre-elec-
tion blocks? 
Marat Kaiypov: Yes, they will be able 
to unite and act as a bloc. 
Rakhat Mamytkojoev (“Erkin Kyr-
gyzstan” party): Let’s say they pass 
into the parliament as a bloc and col-
lapse afterwards. Then the same thing 
that we have under the majority sys-
tem happens again: no discipline, no 
rights.  
Marat Kaiypov: This is a worldwide 
practice. Many parties unite during 
elections to gain the votes of electors. I 
think this is normal. 
Shairbek Juraev (IPP):  As a gov-
ernment representative, what do you 
think about changing the form of the 
government? 
Marat Kaiypov: First, I am an adher-
ent of consistent steps. The people of 
Kyrgyzstan elected Bakiev as a pres-
ident with all that scale of power that 
is provided by the present Constitu-
tion. People voted for him since they 
trust him and believe that he will pull 
the country out of crisis. People were 
aware of power that he would have as 
the head of state and of the executive 
branch. I mean, the government has to 
be under his control; he is commander-
in-chief of the Kyrgyz Republic. He won 
people’s trust and the presidential man-
date, and I would consider his resigna-
tion as a betrayal. 
Zainidin Kurmanov: That is a prob-
lem of morality. 
Marat Kaiypov: No, I do not think 
so. One must not treat the people who 
elected him like this. After all, he was 
elected as a President for fi ve years.   
Zainidin Kurmanov: Yushchenko, 
for instance, agreed to reduce his pow-
er. 
Marat Kaiypov: Yushchenko’s policy 
and electoral campaign initially aimed 
at reducing presidential powers, unlike 
Bakiev’s. As for Bakiev, he did not do 
that, but accepted the ideas of his ar-
dent opponents related to a constitu-
tional reform.   
In my opinion, the form of govern-
ment does not depend on the country’s 
welfare or its economic development. 
It depends on the controlling mecha-
nisms that we set up over ruling individ-
uals. If we want to save a presidential 
form of government, then we need to 
let it work instead of constantly criticiz-
ing it. We need to think out a mecha-
nism whereby the form of government 
is transparent, and not corrupt. 
In case we want a parliamentary form 
of government, then, as was already 
discussed, we need to wait until 2010. 
The reason is very simple: the current 
President was elected by the people 
while holding all the power that he had 
at that moment, and it is impossible just 
to throw him out until his term is over. 
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The President must fi nish his fi ve-year 
term. Moreover, I think he would not 
agree to simply resign all the authority 
that he has now. 
Why has the U.S. Constitution not 
been changed for so many years? 
There is only one reason: there was 
no President or offi cial, who demanded 
that certain personal powers be written 
into the Constitution. This Constitution 
was written for future governments, for 
the future of the state. It contains the 
main principles, and the rest is written 
in laws.
By the way, let me say something on 
the new form of government that we in-
vented – the so-called presidential-par-
liamentary form of government. There 
is no presidential-parliamentary form in 
the theory of constitutional law; it ap-
peared in the post-soviet period. The 
leaders of post-Soviet republics did not 
want to take responsibility for the work 
of the Cabinet (taking into account that 
the USSR collapsed during a serious 
crisis). Communists had delegated their 
authority to Soviets approximately fi ve 
years before the country collapsed, so 
then leaders just changed their chairs 
and the nameplates on their doors. The 
same people are still ruling their coun-
tries: Nazarbaev in Kazakhstan, Ka-
rimov in Uzbekistan, Turkmenbashi in 
Turkmenistan. They set up the post of 
Prime Minister together with the Cabi-
net in order to shift responsibility for 
work to the Cabinet while they them-
selves rule as presidents. 
A President is a Commander-in-
Chief; he is empowered to dismiss the 
government, to chair the Cabinet, and 
to cancel any resolutions passed by the 
Cabinet. Look what powers the Presi-
dents have in the post-soviet states. 
The President is head of the executive 
branch as well as head of the Cabinet. 
Ainagul Abdrakhmanova (IPP): 
What about responsibility? 
Marat Kaiypov:  The President must 
bear responsibility, but as a matter of 
fact, it is the government, who is more 
responsible. For the last 11 years, there 
were several cases in which the gov-
ernment was replaced every time some 
accident happened.
Article seven of the Constitution on 
separation of powers is a key one. 
There are three branches of power in 
the Kyrgyz Republic: legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial. Suddenly the Presi-
dent appears on this list. If the govern-
ment is the Cabinet, then where should 
we transfer President’s power? It turns 
out that he heads the executive branch. 
Therefore, I suggest not reinventing the 
bicycle, but writing down straightfor-
wardly that the President is the head 
executive. However, this was not done, 
due to that notorious agreement be-
tween the President and the Prime Min-
ister. But if we did this, everyone would 
see that we have a presidential form of 
government. 
Zainidin Kurmanov: In neighboring 
Uzbekistan, they have a presidential 
form of government, but their president 
is simultaneously head of the Cabinet. 
Actually, he is responsible for some 
projects, but they also have a Prime 
Minister who always becomes a boy-
for-beating in case the project fails. It 
is very likely that we will have similar 
results while we are using this kind of 
model. 
Valentine Bogatyrev: There are also 
the so-called state counselors, who are 
supervising certain spheres in conjunc-
tion with the Cabinet. Before, it was the 
Secretaries of the Central Committee; 
now it is the ministers and simultane-
ously the state counselors who super-
vise certain spheres. 
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Rakhat Mamytkojoev (“Erkin Kyr-
gyzstan” party): How is it possible to 
restore people’s trust in the process 
that was lost during the last events? 
Valentine Bogatyrev: There are 
ways to improve the situation, of 
course. First, all of the work done by 
the parliament, by its radical-demo-
cratic group, is to be presented to the 
Constitutional Council again. They will 
work further with this version, not with 
the truncated version that was suggest-
ed to nation-wide public discussion. It 
is necessary to return to a zero read-
ing and start discussing all proposals. 
All of them are noteworthy, to be con-
sidered, but I doubt that anyone would 
like to start this process, because it is a 
political battleground. As usual, we will 
have authorities bargaining. This is our 
problem, because in this way we do not 
solve troubles, but on the contrary pre-
serve and redouble them. People’s trust 
in the authorities decreases when they 
demonstrates unwillingness to give up 
their power and do not want to move 
towards democratization. 
The situation can be improved only 
by a cardinal decision. Let’s say the 
President would address the parlia-
ment with: “give us your decision, and 
let’s vote for it”. I think that in this case 
the situation could be improved. But 
this is a suicidal project for him and for 
Kulov, as well as for all those who hold 
executive power at the moment. There-
fore, they dare not do that. 
Aibek Suyuntbekov (“Alga, Kyr-
gyzstan!” party): In article 53 of the 
new draft of the Constitution, it is writ-
ten that the rights of an ex-President 
are additionally established by a law. 
Are not you afraid of the fact that af-
ter the referendum, the President will 
surreptitiously sign the law giving him 
even more power than the ex-President 
Akaev had? Is it necessary to specify 
all of these powers in the Constitution? 
Thank you. 
Zainidin Kurmanov: We were mak-
ing very careful and well-balanced 
suggestions at the very beginning of 
the work of the Constitutional Council. 
We were just asking the President to 
refuse powers that can lead to turning 
the country upside-down, for instance, 
the President’s authority to introduce 
amendments to the Constitution, which 
was the most crucial law allowing 
Akaev to use his power just the way he 
liked for the last 15 years. Kazakhstan 
is a powerful and huge country but 
even its President Nazarbaev does not 
have powers for law making. It would 
be good if our President made a choice 
to refuse at least this power. Absolute 
power corrupts an individual absolute-
ly; this is known to everyone from an-
cient times. If one individual concen-
trates absolute power in his/her hands 
(especially without any political organi-
zation or any program goals), then the 
power is generally transferred to illegiti-
mate institutions. We have a parliament 
and a Cabinet; however, decisions are 
made by the President’s daughter, son 
or son-in-law. Since he cannot man-
age all his powers, he starts delegating 
them to his relatives and friends. This 
is our trouble. It was like that under 
Akaev, and we still face the same prob-
lem. Akaev also was a good President 
at the beginning; I was happy in all sin-
cerity when he was elected. Later how-
ever, we could not fi nd a way to get rid 
of him, and had to resort to a rebellion. 
Any other President can suffer from the 
same fate. Therefore, it is necessary to 
create a constitutional model that would 
not allow us to go back to that past, so 
that there will not be a new tragedy dur-
ing new times. The authorities must be 
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responsible, under control, accounta-
ble, and transparent. 
We see only one way: the extraordi-
nary powers concentrated in the hands 
of one individual who fails to exercise 
them must be transferred to legitimate 
institutions, the parliament and Cabinet, 
because they are empowered to man-
age and bear responsibility. Our presi-
dent is even ahead of Latin-American 
Presidents in terms of power, which 
has been a problem for their countries 
since forever. All of this was done with 
only one purpose, hidden from us – to 
prolong personal power, to stay on as 
a ruler, to reign supreme, to have ac-
cess to property, to control, to rob, and 
to steel. 
Valentine Bogatyrev: I do not see a 
topic to discuss in this matter at all. I 
suppose international experience can-
not serve as an argument in this case. 
No situation is unique to Kyrgyzstan, 
and only internal arguments must be 
considered. 
However, I would like to answer the 
question on including powers of the 
ex-President into the Constitution, and 
why it is referred to in a law in the cur-
rent draft of the Constitution. You see 
that now there is no guarantee at all. 
If you are a bad President people will 
throw you away together with all your 
power. If you are a good President, you 
will be granted a higher pension, a car, 
so that you can live your peaceful life. 
In my opinion, this is not a law-making 
issue at all. I think we are in the proc-
ess of working out mechanisms for in-
teraction, acquiring skills and the ability 
to hear each other, to negotiate, and to 
work on arguments. 
My opinion is that it is impossible to 
teach the authorities; they are subject to 
frequent replacement. When trainings 
for ministers are conducted, I always 
question: why are you teaching them, 
they will be replaced tomorrow? Moreo-
ver they are taught things about which 
they have no idea – management tech-
nology – why in the world would they 
need it? 
I worked with Akaev for almost three 
years, and witnessed a phenomenon 
when we both were looking at the same 
text but read different things. He found 
in the text things that coincided with his 
beliefs, which were formed by some-
one else. The rest was thrown out. Un-
fortunately, powerful positions change 
a person a lot; for example, Kulov has 
changed considerably.
Shairbek Juraev (IPP): Taking into 
consideration regional, clannish, and 
other divisions in our society, do you 
think the absence of a strong President 
would make the parliament dysfunc-
tional?  
Zainidin Kurmanov: What is hap-
pening at the moment is a result of four 
constitutional reforms. All these reforms 
led people up a blind alley, and fi nally to 
the events of March 24th. A Parliamen-
tary republic with a proportional system 
of election is less risky. We cannot ab-
solutely exclude the risk that parliament 
will again be represented by clans, but 
the risk will considerably deceased 
since a system of proportional elections 
is different from a majority system.
I would argue that the present system 
will never provide honest and just elec-
tions. The reason is that the President 
is very anxious about election results. 
Who was busy with falsifi cation and law 
violation, with welding people? State 
agencies that are supposed to protect 
the law were actively involved in this 
disgrace, because the main problem to 
be solved was how to create a qualifi ed 
majority out of Akaev’s adherents in the 
parliament. Look what is happening 
now: the president was replaced, but 
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the system remains the same. Again fa-
vored individuals have appeared close 
to the President; the factor of family has 
come forth; a process of property redis-
tribution is going on; and we know who 
are favored in electoral districts. 
Our constitution is always written for 
someone. However, it needs to be writ-
ten for the country, for the citizens. A 
Constitution is not to be written by the 
authorities, and government members 
are not to participate in the Constitu-
tional Council. The Constitution should 
be written by specialists in constitution-
al law. I agree that it needs an inventory 
in order to fi nd out what are the prob-
lems and tragedies of our Constitution. 
Where are our lawyers? Where are 
our counselors who were supposed to 
suggest this way so that it did not turn 
into a bazaar? The Parliament started 
to force this process because revolu-
tionary enthusiasm decreases quickly, 
and it was obvious that the President 
was not going to change anything. The 
President is not an expert; he may be 
unaware of many things. Besides, as 
Bogatyrev has said, our President is 
not subject to re-education. As long as 
there is no earnest political market with 
earnest and real competition, it is hard 
to talk of bringing up political leaders. 
Elmira Nogoibaeva (Internation-
al Institute for Strategic Studies): It 
seems to me that while discussing, we 
have not solved the main issue: who or 
what will lead the country out of crisis? 
Valentin Borisovich said it could be civil 
society and Zainidin Karpekovich does 
not agree. Is it possible to voice any ar-
guments on civil society?    
Valentin Bogatyrev: I think so just 
because now, for instance, I am dis-
cussing these problems with those who 
want to change the situation. There are 
many of such people, and their num-
bers are growing. Therefore, I think this 
is the only instrument. No one but the 
civil society with all its sectors – analyti-
cal elites, NGOs, mass media – is able 
to counteract the government. It was al-
ways like that. Otherwise, it will be an 
external power. Someone from the out-
side will have to establish order.
-39-
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Esenbek Urmanov1
If previously this problem was com-
pensated because the population had 
not run out of patience, and the short-
comings of government were “forgiven” 
in the hope of achieving positive chang-
es in the long-run, then at the moment 
the situation has been exacerbated. 
The disgraceful end of Akaev’s rule has 
destroyed the public’s patience, and 
today time is already playing against 
the new administration. Rhetoric and 
dogma, which have been used in the 
past by the leadership of the country to 
cover up nepotism and a lack of profes-
sionalism in personnel policy, should 
be replaced in the nearest future with 
specifi c actions intended to bring spe-
cifi c results. 
Now there is an understanding that 
government bodies, as decision-mak-
ing centers, are in dire need of com-
petent and responsible employees. 
Since government decisions affect the 
entire society and are aimed at provid-
ing citizens with public goods and cre-
ating conditions for the realization of 
their rights and freedoms, then public 
practice itself requires that all decisions 
made by government bodies be of good 
quality, feasible and productive. 
Decisions are directly depend on the 
quality of human resources. Ideally, 
there should be a concentration of the 
best staff in government agencies, and 
appointments in the executive branch 
Civil service today: problems and solutions
The political events that unfolded after the “Tulip revolution” have exposed prob-
lems regarding the competency and civic responsibility of government employees at 
all  levels.
of power should depend on the level of 
professional training of the staff. 
In Kyrgyzstan, in order to join the gov-
ernment one has to meet the require-
ments of the “old gentleman’s club”: 
personal loyalty, friendly association 
with people from the same area, nepo-
tism, and “solvency.” 
It is no secret that the problem has 
become systemic: those who join the 
government in order to serve the pub-
lic, who openly in practice reject nepo-
tism and bribery, cannot make a good 
and progressive career. A great defi cit 
of educated and competent personnel, 
adequately prepared to face the chal-
lenges of the day, threatens Kyrgyzstan 
with the prospect of becoming a failed 
state. 
It is impossible to solve this problem 
immediately, of course. Such aspects 
of the problem as nepotism and bribery 
are manifestations of the general cor-
ruptibility of the system and society, and 
they require consistent reforms with a 
long-term perspective in education and 
performance of the government, as 
well as incorporation and strengthening 
of market mechanisms in the govern-
ment. However, the problem of educa-
tion and competency is forced to the 
background by a number of primary is-
sues, the solution of which could con-
siderably improve the situation with hir-
ing personnel in government agencies. 
   1    Esenbek Urmanov, Public Relations Manager with the Bishkek Business Club, is a participant of the “Policy debate and 
good governance” project. This is the second essay in a series of articles by participants of the project.
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The following could be listed among 
these issues: 
• Low salary of civil servants. To-
day civil servants cannot have a salary 
which could be adequately compara-
ble with salaries at commercial compa-
nies and international organizations. A 
low salary forces people to use budg-
etary funds illegally or to sell informa-
tion within their jurisdiction. According 
to data from the National Statistical 
Agency, as of December 1st, 2005 the 
average cost of living is 1,843 soms per 
month nationally, whereas in Bishkek it 
is 1,943 soms. Presently, employees of 
ministries make 1,200 to 1,600 soms 
per month. As a comparison, employ-
ees of NGOs, depending on rank, re-
ceive from 100 to 300 USD per month, 
and employees of international organi-
zations make from 200 to 800 USD, al-
so depending on their rank. It is obvi-
ous that the situation with remuneration 
in government agencies is unenviable: 
the salary of an employee in a ministry 
is below even the average cost of liv-
ing. 
• Instability of work in government 
agencies. Personnel reshuffl ing is done 
because of voluntarism and the ambi-
tions of political appointees, whereas in 
stable countries civil servants become a 
stably-functioning social stratum. Every 
newly appointed offi cial in Kyrgyzstan 
brings along “his own” people and cre-
ates a corporate culture which favors 
him.
• Absence of guarantees for pro-
motion and lack of prospects. Civil 
service does not guarantee a desir-
able career or high reputation. Moreo-
ver, civil servants as a social group are 
the most unprotected in legal and social 
spheres. 
It is obvious that lack of attention to 
these problems of governance could 
result in exacerbation of the systemic 
crisis in Kyrgyzstan.
Furthermore, the crisis is aggravated 
by the fact that high-ranking offi cials 
still do not have clear and specifi c goals 
that are understandable to the public or 
to mid-level offi cials.   The VIPs should 
identify what direction Kyrgyzstan is 
taking and what our end goal is as soon 
as possible, say, in the next ten years. 
Another part of the problem is that the 
government is virtually detached from 
the public. It exists by and for itself, and 
is not aimed at serving the needs of citi-
zens. 
Thus, now we can already see po-
tential risks for Kyrgyzstan. 
First of all, ineffective government 
could result in the loss of the country’s 
independence, if not de jure then de 
facto. This situation could be caused 
partially due to the incompetent work 
of local and central government agen-
cies, by which some parts of the coun-
try fall under the material, commercial 
and informational infl uence of neigh-
boring states. On the other hand, the 
current personnel chaos on the top lev-
el of government could be bring about 
a situation whereby certain ambitious 
politicians, in search of political sup-
port, seek assistance from the infl uen-
tial political circles of other states. All of 
this cannot but concern us! 
Secondly, persistence and function-
ing of the political system inherited from 
the Soviet epoch and Akaev’s rule will 
give way to, not prevent, new dictator-
ships – if not of one person then of a 
ruling clan. The country is not rich with 
natural resources, which could com-
pensate authoritarian rule, which the 
administration could rely on while solv-
ing socio-economic problems. The only 
resource of the country – its citizens, 
their entrepreneurial spirit and creativ-
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ity, their energy and courage – could 
work only under a policy of non-inter-
ference from offi cials. 
Thirdly, persistence of inconsistent, 
unclear personnel reshuffl ing threatens 
to aggravate the social tension, fraught 
with a “new revolution” accompanied 
by new lootings and redistribution of 
resources (property), which the coun-
try will not likely endure.
What could be recommended under 
these conditions? 
In a short-term perspective – it is ad-
visable to intro-
duce norms that 
bind government 
agencies to make 
decisions in the 
format of public 
policy. Proce-
dures of public 
policy, the best 
m a n a g e m e n t 
technologies at 
the moment, al-
low the public to infl uence decisions 
made by government offi cials and to 
consult them. State policy concepts, 
laws and resolutions made by authori-
ties, should be determined in certain 
spheres with mandatory participation by 
interested parties. During the process of 
employing procedures of public policy, 
the positions of such parties are heard 
and coordinated; analytical reports are 
prepared which present variant plans 
and the anticipated consequences of 
implementing each alternative. The 
advantages of decisions made in the 
format of public policy are observation 
and realization of the interests of the 
public, of the citizens of the country. 
Consequently, decisions made outside 
the format of public policy (except deci-
sions of special services and the mili-
tary) should be considered illegitimate. 
In this way, it is possible to eliminate 
management practices which serves 
the interests of offi cials. It is also nec-
essary to establish control over the 
implementation of norms of legislation, 
which requires entrance to the civil ser-
vice through merit-competition. 
In addition, in a short-term perspec-
tive – it is advisable to reconsider the 
current administrative-territorial division 
of  hierarchy: heads of oblasts and ray-
ons and their staff deal with issues that 
the local self-government could suc-
cessfully handle. Thus, there should be 
a reduction of the staffs of offi cials. It is 
essential to delegate government func-
tions to local self-government as much 
as possible. All of this should result in 
releasing budgetary funds to raise the 
salaries of civil servants several fold. It 
is also essential to determine the form 
of government: presidential or parlia-
mentary. As management practices 
in our country have demonstrated, a 
mixed form of government allows the 
President, Cabinet and parliament to 
avoid responsibility for the implementa-
tion of government policy. This system 
inevitably leads to the creation of par-
allel administrations, parallel depart-
ments and offi ces in the administration 
of the President and Prime Minister’s 
Offi ce, both bodies being presented as 
executive agencies. Based on natural 
managerial needs, both the President 
and Prime Minister set up the structure 
of their staffs, hire staff, assign duties 
and tasks, etc. Moreover, the staffs 
grow in size due to attempts of VIPs 
to supervise all spheres of public life 
according to Soviet tradition. For this 
reason, the public has to realize that, 
given scarce resources, maintaining 
these structures of the state machinery 
As the best man-
agement technol-
ogies at the mo-
ment, procedures 
of public policy 
allow the public 
to infl uence de-
cisions made by 
government offi -
cials and to con-
sult them.
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and organizing their work bears heavily 
on the national budget, and therefore 
on taxpayers.
 In a long-term perspective – it is es-
sential to introduce special legal norms 
which will protect the administrative staff 
of government agencies, including the 
post of deputy minister, from arbitrary 
political appointments, and to provide 
a high level of social protection for civil 
servants. A useful compulsory measure 
could be the withdrawal of government 
offi cials who represent the generation 
of the 40s and 50s of the previous cen-
tury. The values and knowledge of this 
generation do not meet the challenges 
and realities of the present day. Their 
attitudes to many phenomena in the 
society, their thinking and decisions, 
contradict the interests of the public.
